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1471 
LOCKING THE GOLDEN DOOR AND THROWING AWAY THE 
KEY: AN ANALYSIS OF ASYLUM DURING THE YEARS OF THE 
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
 
Samantha B. Karpman* 
“Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to 
breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.  Send these, 




The years of the Trump Administration have certainly been 
some of the most divisive in modern American political history.  One 
of the largest divides arose from former President Trump’s brazen, 
“zero tolerance” immigration policies that relentlessly attacked many 
forms of immigration coming into the United States.  Asylum-based 
immigration, which allows immigrants to come to this country as a 
safe haven when they are fleeing persecution in their home countries, 
was one of former President Trump’s main targets.  Former President 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2022, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A. 
Political Science, Pennsylvania State University.  I would like to thank my friends 
and family for all the love and encouragement they have given me over the years 
and for always inspiring me to follow my passion.  I would also like to thank 
Professor Seplowitz and the members of the Law Review who have been 
instrumental in the construction of my Note through their continued support and 
guidance during the entire process including: Editors-in-Chief, Kaleigh Gorman 
and Ariel Berkowitz; Managing Editors, Bryan Schenkman and Margaret 
Goodman; my Notes Editors, Alessandra Albano and Mike Petridis; and my 
Research Editor, Siara Ossa.  Finally, I would like to thank my three remarkable 
faculty advisors: Professor Jeffrey B. Morris (for helping to shape my Note in its 
early stages), Professor Rajat Shankar (for his immense knowledge of immigration 
law), and Professor Jorge Roig (for his incredible expertise in constitutional law). 
1 Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nps.gov/stli/learn/historyculture/colossus.htm.  
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Trump even came dangerously close to eliminating asylum-based 
immigration with his “Death to Asylum” policy in December of 
2020.  President Biden has since reversed many of former President 
Trump’s detrimental asylum policies and enacted executive orders 
that facilitate asylum-based immigration.  While asylum-based 
immigration has been saved by President Biden (for now), the actions 
of the Trump Administration have highlighted the issues regarding 
lack of consistency and over-delegation to the executive branch that 
plague immigration law to this day.  This Note will examine various 
sources of asylum law, both prior to and during the Trump 
Administration, and evaluate the constitutionality of asylum policies 
between 2016 and 2020.  Finally, this Note will give four 
recommendations future administrations can implement in order to 
provide fairer and more consistent asylum policies that are not so 
dependent on which President happens to be in power at the time: (1) 
creating a direct, fair, and inclusive path to citizenship; (2) decreasing 
ICE’s role in exchange for increasing the EOIR’s presence; (3) 
changing the focus in creating available facilities to immigrants; and 
(4) guaranteeing legal representation in immigration proceedings. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Emma Lazarus’ powerful words, inscribed on the Statue of 
Liberty, serve as both a reminder of our nation’s rich immigrant 
history and an inspiring message to those who come to this country to 
build a better life for themselves and their families as part of the 
“American dream.” 
Ever since the colonial era, the United States – referred to 
then as part of the “New World” – has always been thought of as a 
destination of hope and opportunity.  During the colonial period, a 
large influx of people came, mainly from European nations, to 
colonize and settle areas that would eventually form the United 
States.2  The United States facilitated free-flowing immigration 
without any restrictions for roughly a century after it became an 
independent nation.3  During the American Industrial Revolution,4 
 
2 U.S. Immigration Before 1965, HISTORY (July 28, 2020), 
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/u-s-immigration-before-
1965#section_1. 
3 Historical Overview of Immigration Policy, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD., 
https://cis.org/Historical-Overview-Immigration-Policy (last visited June 16, 2021); 
2
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especially from 1880 to 1920, the federal government issued 
regulations to monitor the “first wave of immigration.”5  Prior to this 
era, immigration was primarily governed by the individual states.6  
However, the federal government became more involved in 
regulating immigration through the introduction of federal 
legislation.7  Restrictions imposed by the new federal legislation not 
only complicated the process of coming to the country, they also 
made the necessary qualifications to successfully immigrate with full 
documentation increasingly difficult to satisfy.8  The complications 
created by immigration legislation are especially difficult for 
immigrants who may not feasibly be able to wait for years in order 
for their paperwork to process.9  Among this group of immigrants are 
asylum seekers, individuals who want to escape their home countries 
due to a fear of persecution or other life-or-death situations.10 
This Note will discuss the Trump Administration’s attempt to 
effectively nullify asylum-based immigration11 and how former 
President Trump used both the broad delegation of authority to the 
executive branch in the field of immigration law and the pandemic to 
justify his actions.12  At the same time, this Note will analyze what 
President Biden has done during his term so far13 – under the same 
 
Philip Martin, Trends in Migration to the U.S., POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU 
(May 19, 2014), https://www.prb.org/us-migration-trends. 
4 The American Industrial Revolution occurred in the late nineteenth to early 
twentieth centuries.  The Industrial Revolution in the United States, LIBR. OF 
CONG., https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/industrial-revolution-in-the-
united-states (last visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
5 U.S. Immigration Before 1965, supra note 2.   
6 Id.   
7 See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (holding that the powers to set 
rules regarding immigration and manage foreign relations rested with the federal 
government, not the individual states).  Since this case, there has been a plethora of 
federal immigration regulations that created “waves” of immigration.  See A Brief 
History of Civil Rights in the United States, GEO. L. LIBR. (Jan. 27, 2021, 11:42 
AM), https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=4171684. 
8 Michelle Mark, Jeff Sessions Said Immigrants Should ‘Wait Their Turn’ to Come 





11 See infra Section V. 
12 See infra Sections VI-VII. 
13 As of the date of publication of this Note, which is in October 2021. 
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authority as former President Trump – to preserve and facilitate 
asylum-based immigration.14  Along with discussing the differences 
in asylum policies between the two administrations, this Note will 
provide several general solutions that can be implemented to help 
create lasting and consistent immigration reform that does not 
fluctuate from administration to administration.15  There are two 
limitations on the overall scope of this Note.  First, this Note will 
mainly limit its analysis to the highest level of actors of each of the 
three branches of the federal government.  Second, while there are 
several ways an individual can immigrate to the United States under 
current immigration law, this Note will focus solely on asylum. 
This Note will be divided into nine sections.  Section II will 
discuss the development of federal immigration law in the United 
States.  Section III will give a general overview of asylum and the 
asylum process.  Section IV will discuss and offer the history of the 
different sources of American asylum law, including federal statutes, 
major Supreme Court decisions, executive orders, treaties, and 
international norms.  Section V will examine asylum policies during 
the Trump Administration.  Section VI will evaluate the 
constitutionality of the polices discussed in Section V.  Section VII 
will discuss the COVID-19 pandemic and the pandemic’s impact on 
United States immigration policies, especially regarding asylum 
seekers.  Section VIII will address various solutions, and discuss 
what the Biden Administration has already done, to overcome 
contemporary asylum hurdles through immigration reform.  Finally, 
Section IX will conclude the Note. 
II. IMMIGRATION WAVES & HOW THEY SHAPED U.S. FEDERAL 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
The first wave of immigration began around the Civil War, 
when some states passed legislation allowing immigrant laborers and 
soldiers to enter the country.16  Following the ruling in Chy Lung v. 
Freeman,17 and the enormous increase in immigration throughout the 
 
14 See infra Section VIII. 
15 See infra Sections VIII-IX. 
16 Éva Eszter Szabó, The Migration Factor in the American Civil War: The Impact 
of Voluntary Population Movements on the War Effort, AMERICANA (Spring 2016), 
http://americanaejournal.hu/vol12no1/szabo. 
17 92 U.S. 275 (1876). 
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latter half of the nineteenth century,18 Congress passed the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Alien Contract Labor Laws of 1885 
and 1887 to restrict labor-based immigration.19  The Immigration Act 
of 1882 imposed a fifty-cent tax for each immigrant and excluded 
certain groups of people from the country including “idiots, lunatics, 
convicts, and persons likely to become a public charge.”20  The 
Immigration Act of 1891 further excluded certain immigrant groups 
including “polygamists, persons convicted of crimes of moral 
turpitude, and those suffering loathsome or contagious diseases.”21  
Finally, among this wave’s most notable regulations are the creation 
of immigration checkpoints22 and a standardized immigration and 
naturalization policy.23   
The second wave of immigration began with a large group of 
immigrants coming into the United States around the time of World 
War I and a few years following the end of the war.24  From 1900 to 
1920, the U.S. admitted over 14.5 million immigrants.25  In response 
to growing fears about mass immigration and its impact on the 
country, Congress passed a series of immigration regulations in the 
Immigration Act of 1917 to slow down the rate of immigration.26  
The Immigration Act of 1917 required that certain factors must be 
satisfied so a person could be eligible to immigrate.27  These factors 
included the immigrant’s literacy in their native language, more 
rigorous medical examinations, and imposing additional paper 
 
18 Szabó, supra note 16; see also Early American Immigration Policies, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (July 30, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/about-
us/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/early-american-immigration-policies. 
19 Early American Immigration Policies, supra note 18. 
20 Id. 
21 Origins of the Federal Immigration Service, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 
(July 30, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-ins-
history/origins-of-the-federal-immigration-service. 
22 Id.  The most famous of these checkpoints was Ellis Island in New York.  Id.  
Other entry locations included cities with busy travel ports including Boston and 
Philadelphia.  Id. 
23 Id.; Origins of the Federal Naturalization Service, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-
ins-history/origins-of-the-federal-naturalization-service. 
24 Mass Immigration and WWI, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (July 30, 
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requirements such as passports and border crossing cards.28  At the 
end of the post-World War I wave, the federal government 
implemented the national origin quota system.29  Under the quota 
system, each nationality received a maximum quota of valid visas it 
could issue based on its representation in past census figures.30  
Along with the severe restrictions imposed by the quota system and 
the 1917 Immigration Act, Congress created the U.S. Border Patrol 
within the Immigration Service to enforce these new regulations.31 
The third wave of immigration started during World War II.32  
The federal government took measures to tighten control at the 
domestic border in response to the national security threat looming on 
the horizon.33  The increased security measures included heightened 
recording procedures, organized internment camps and detention 
facilities for enemy aliens, and increased Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”) personnel.34  At the same time, the 
federal government and INS personnel eliminated barriers for 
noncitizens to serve in the military and created more efficient 
overseas naturalization processes.35 
The fourth wave is characterized by the implementation of 
post-World War II relief.36  Among the most notable pieces of 
legislation from this period is the Immigration and Nationality Act.37  
This Act, which Congress enacted in 1952, reformed and re-codified 
 
28 Id. 









35 Military Naturalization During WWII, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 
6, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/overview-of-
ins-history/military-naturalization-during-wwii. 
36 Post-War Years, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/post-war-
years. 
37 Id.  The INA is also referred to as the Hart-Celler Act due to the names of the 
main sponsors of the bill, Philip Hart and Emanuel Celler.  Jerry Kammer, The 
Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 30, 2015), 
https://cis.org/Report/HartCeller-Immigration-Act-1965. 
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the entire United States immigration system.38  The Immigration and 
Nationality Act received significant amendments in 1965, which is 
the current version of the Act.39  One of the key revisions to the 
immigration law during this period was the stark reduction of the 
quota system, which de-racialized immigration and created a shift 
from European-heavy immigration to Asian and Latin American-
heavy immigration.40   
The fifth wave started around 1980 and lasted until the 
1990s.41  During this time, changes in world migration patterns made 
modern international travel much easier and created a growing 
emphasis on controlling illegal immigration.42  The immigration 
regulations defining this period included the Refugee Act of 1980, 
the Immigration Act of 1990 (“IMMACT 90”), and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(“IIRIRA”).43 
Finally, the most recent wave of immigration and immigration 
reform took place in the post-9/11 era.44  After the events of the 
September 11 terrorist attack, the federal government became hyper-
vigilant about border security and removing criminal aliens for the 
protection of the country.45  This wave of immigration marked the 
creation of three immigration agencies under the newly-created 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”): Customs and Border 
Protection (“CBP”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), 
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).46 
 
38 Post-War Years, supra note 36. 
39 Id. 
40 Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population 
Growth and Change Through 2065, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2015), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/28/modern-immigration-wave-
brings-59-million-to-u-s-driving-population-growth-and-change-through-2065. 
41 Late Twentieth Century, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/late-twentieth-
century.   
42 Id.   
43 Id. 
44 Post-9/11, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019), 
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III. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Asylum-based immigration serves as a refuge for individuals 
who face a credible fear of persecution, if they are forced to return to 
their home country.47  Asylum immigration began in the United 
States as early as 1948 when President Truman allowed a great 
number of Europeans, including Jewish and Eastern-European 
refugees, to enter the United States following World War II.48  
Similar to other forms of immigration, asylum was largely formalized 
and established in the post-World War II wave of immigration 
through the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.49 
Under current immigration laws, asylum can be either 
affirmative or defensive.50  For both affirmative and defensive 
asylum, applicants file an Application for Asylum and Withholding 
of Removal (“I-589 Application”).51  Applicants seeking affirmative 
asylum file this application with the USCIS before they are detained 
or threatened with removal.52  For defensive asylum claims, an 
applicant has already been detained before he or she has had a chance 
to file the asylum application with the  USCIS.53  Therefore, for 
 
47 Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Aug. 25, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum.  Asylum laws 
have constantly been reworked and redefined to include or exclude certain groups 
of people.  Id.  The current groups allowed to state a claim for asylum under the 
current system are those that have suffered persecution or have a reasonable fear 
persecution due to the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.  Id. 
48 Morning Edition, The History of Asylum Laws, NPR (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624566268/the-history-of-asylum-laws. 
49 U.S. Immigration Before 1965, supra note 2. 
50 Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-
asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-in-the-united-states.  The key difference between 
affirmative and defensive asylum is the timing of when the immigrant submits the 
asylum application.  Id.  The legal requirements for affirmative and defensive 
asylum are the same.  Id. 
51 I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
& IMMIGR. SERVS. (Aug. 25, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-589.pdf. 
52 The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 22, 
2020), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/the-
affirmative-asylum-process. 
53 Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 50. 
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defensive asylum claims, the paperwork for the I-589 Application 
must be filed with the immigration court that either hears the 
applicant’s removal proceedings or encompasses the jurisdiction of 
the applicant’s detention location.54 
Additionally, there are bars to asylum that neither affirmative 
nor defensive asylum petitions can overcome, except for instances of 
“changed circumstances” or “extraordinary circumstances.”55  Bars to 
asylum can occur when: (1) a previous asylum application made by 
the applicant was denied by an immigration judge or the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “the Board”) or (2) the applicant can 
be safely removed to a third country under a two-party or multi-party 
agreement between the United States and potential host country.56  
Applicants can also include spouses and any of their children, if the 
child is unmarried and under the age of twenty-one, in their I-589 
applications, so long as the included person also currently resides in 
the United States.57 
Next, once the USCIS receives the completed application, the 
applicant goes through fingerprinting and background checks.58  
Following the background checks, the next step is the interview 
process.59  Everyone who is included in the application must be 
present for the interview, including any children or spouses the 
applicant chose to include.60  The applicant may also attend the 
 
54 Id. 
55 Establishing Good Cause or Exceptional Circumstances, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVS. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-
and-asylum/asylum/establishing-good-cause-or-exceptional-circumstances. 
56 Id.  These examples are not the only scenarios where a bar can thwart an asylum 
petition, but they are among the most common bars to asylum listed on the USCIS 
website.  Id. 
57 Asylum, supra note 47. 
58 The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 52. 
59 Id.  To schedule the interview, the applicant will receive a notice to make an 
appointment with an asylum officer at one of the eight asylum offices, two asylum 
sub-offices, or at a USCIS field office.  Id.  Applicants who were originally 
scheduled for an interview that had to be rescheduled at the applicant’s request or 
to meet the needs of USCIS receive first priority for obtaining interview dates.  Id.  
Second priority goes to applications that have been pending for twenty-one days or 
less since filing.  Id.  Third priority goes to all other asylum interviews.  Id.  
Asylum interviews usually last an hour and the asylum officer asks questions about 
specific material that applicants included in their I-589 application.  Id. 
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interview with an attorney61 and an interpreter, if needed.62  After the 
interview, the asylum office issues a decision.63  If the asylum office 
grants asylum, the case is concluded and the applicant is an asylee.64  
However, if the asylum office does not grant the application for 
asylum, the case is referred to the immigration court for de novo 
review.65 
Once in immigration court, the asylum petition, even if it 
started out as affirmative, is now defensive because the applicant is 
now subject to removal proceedings.66  At this time, the DHS issues a 
notice to appear in immigration court.67  This notice serves as the 
charging instrument to initiate the action in immigration court.68  
Following the DHS’s actions, or similar actions by any other relevant 
enforcement agency, such as ICE, there is a master calendar 
hearing.69  A master calendar hearing is usually the first time the 
immigrant is before an immigration judge from the Executive Office 
for Immigrant Review (“EOIR”).70  One purpose of a master calendar 
hearing is administrative – allowing the immigration court to obtain 
background information about the applicant’s immigration status and 
to schedule the applicant’s merits hearing.71  In addition to its 
 
61 Id.; see also KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43613, ALIENS’ RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF (2016).  Unlike defendants’ 
fundamental right to an attorney in criminal law where, even if they cannot afford 
an attorney, one will always be provided for them, there is no right to an attorney in 
immigration law.  Id.  If immigrants would like to have an attorney help them 
through the paper application process, asylum interview, and/or any court 
proceedings, they must be able to find and pay for the attorney themselves.  Id. 
62 Preparing for Your Asylum Interview, supra note 60. 
63 Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, IMMIGR. JUST., 
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Asylum%20Flow%20
Chart.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). 
64 Id. 
65 Id.   
66 Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 50. 
67 Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, supra note 63. 
68 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (2020). 
69 Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 50. 
70 When You’ll Get the Immigration Court Judge’s Decision, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/judges-decision-immigration-court-how-
long-it-will-take-get.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). 
71 See Immigration Judge Master Calendar Checklist for Pro Se Respondents, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/924091/download (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2020) (discussing the types of questions asked at a master calendar 
hearing). 
10
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administrative purpose, a master calendar hearing allows judges to 
make other procedural decisions in a removal case.72  Therefore, the 
judge can issue multiple master calendar hearings if the judge 
believes more information is needed before the applicant’s individual 
merits hearing.73 
The merits hearing occurs at the conclusion of the master 
calendar hearing(s).74  This hearing serves as the trial portion of the 
removal proceedings, where both the government and the applicant 
present their substantive cases to the immigration judge as to whether 
the applicant should be allowed to stay in the United States.75  At the 
conclusion of the merits hearing, the immigration judge makes a 
decision, either orally at the hearing or in writing one to six months 
later, on whether to grant asylum.76  If the judge decides to grant 
asylum and DHS does not appeal, the applicant is now an asylee and 
his or her case in immigration court is now over.77 
However, if the immigration judge denies or grants asylum 
but DHS appeals, the appeal is then heard before the Board.78  The 
BIA then makes its decision on whether to grant the appeal.79  If the 
BIA grants asylum, the applicant becomes an asylee or, if asylum 
was originally denied, the case is remanded to immigration court.80   
If the BIA denies asylum, applicants may file a petition for 
review at the federal circuit court encompassing the trial court where 
 
72 Id. 
73 Master Calendar Hearing, IMMIGR. JUST. CAMPAIGN, 
https://immigrationjustice.us/get-trained/lpr-cancellation/master-calendar-hearing 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2020).  
74 Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 50; Conversation with Rajat 
Shankar formerly from Touro Law Center on Sep. 25, 2020 at 1:30 PM EST.  If 
immigration judges choose to have multiple calendar hearings, they will often have 
no more than three total calendar hearings.  Id.  By that time, judges often believe 
they have gathered enough information for the individual merits hearing.  Id. 
75 Fong & Aquino, Merits Hearing Versus the Master Calendar Docket, FONG & 
AQUINO (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.immigrationvisaattorneyblog.com/merits-
hearing-versus-master-calendar-docket. 
76 Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, supra note 63. 
77 Id.  Once the applicant’s case is concluded, the threat of removal ends as well.  
Id. 
78 Id.  The appeal must be filed with the BIA within thirty days of the immigration 
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the immigration hearing was originally held.81  If the circuit court 
grants the petition, the case is remanded to the BIA.82  However, if 
the petition is denied, the applicant is ordered to be removed from the 
United States.83 
The process involved in asylum claims is very lengthy; for 
example, the average case in 2019 took the EOIR 816 days to 
complete.84  Due to the significant amount of time involved in 
litigating asylum cases, there is an enormous backlog in the 
immigration system.85  Forty-eight percent of the immigration court 
backlog, more than 476,000 asylum cases, were pending in the 
immigration court system.86  Along with the increased burden on the 
immigration system, there has been a spike of expedited removal 
proceedings referred by Border Patrol to USCIS over the past ten 
years.87 
IV. DIFFERENT SOURCES OF ASYLUM LAW 
Each branch of the federal government plays a distinct role in 
establishing modern asylum law.  The separation of powers among 
the branches must be kept in mind when dealing with asylum cases.88  
This is because one of the current issues facing asylum law is that the 
federal government has thrown off a delicate balance and granted an 
extreme amount of power to the executive branch at the expense of: 
(1) the inherent powers of the other two branches and (2) even more 
 
81 Appeals of BIA Decisions, STONE GRZEGOREK & GONZALEZ LLP, 
https://www.sggimmigration.com/practice-groups/family-
removal/litigation/appeals-of-bia-decisions (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).  The 
applicant’s petition for review is generally filed in the federal circuit court where 
the immigration hearing was originally held.  Id. 
82 Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, supra note 63. 
83 Id. 
84 Andrew R. Arthur, Statistics Reveal the Scope of the Asylum Backlog, CTR. FOR 
IMMIGR. STUD. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://cis.org/Arthur/Statistics-Reveal-Scope-
Asylum-Backlog. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  Out of asylum cases in the immigration court backlog, roughly 71.2% of 
those cases – 340,810 – are affirmative asylum applications.  Id. 
87 Id.  This percentage increased from five percent to more than forty percent.  Id. 
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importantly, the rights of asylum applicants.89  While this Note will 
mainly focus on domestic law, this section will also briefly discuss 
international conventions, because many of our domestic asylum 
laws come from norms and customs that arise under principles of 
international law.90  Finally, due to this Note’s focus on asylum law, 
these sections will only address sources of immigration law that have 
had either a direct or indirect impact on asylum-based immigration.91  
A. Congress 
1. General Constitutional Power 
Out of the three branches of the federal government, 
Congress, has the broadest power to regulate immigration law under 
the Constitution.92  The Constitution grants Congress a plenary power 
in regulating immigration law.93  Not only does Congress have the 
 
89 See id. 
90 Study Guide: The Rights of Refugees, UNIV. OF MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR. (2003), 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/studyguides/refugees.htm. 
91 This means that several major sources of immigration law will not be discussed 
due to their inapplicability to asylum.  For example, Section IV(A) will not discuss 
pieces of legislation such as the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which focused 
squarely on race-based bars to immigration (not on persecution or fear of the 
immigrant), and 1990 Immigration Act, which specifically leaves out special 
classes of immigrants such as refugees and asylees.  See Chinese Exclusion Act, 
Pub. L. No. 47-126 (1882); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 (1990).  
While  other crucial Supreme Court cases helped develop immigration law in 
general such as Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (addressing the 
Constitutional issues associated with indefinite periods of post-removal-period 
detention) and Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) 
(ruling on the administrative procedures of deportation), they will not be discussed 
in Section IV(B) because they do not deal with asylum law.  Finally, Section IV(C) 
will not address crucial non-asylum policies such as President Reagan’s and Bush 
Sr.’s “Family Fairness” policy, Executive Order 12081, which terminated the 
expedited naturalization process for military personnel, and Executive Order 
12324, which deals with the confrontation of illegal aliens at the border.  See 
Immigration Council Strongly Reaffirms Research on Reagan-Bush Family 
Fairness Policy, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Dec. 5, 2014); Exec. Order. No. 12081, 43 
Fed. Reg. 42,237 (Sept. 18, 1978); Exec. Order. No. 12324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 
(Sept. 18, 1978).   
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enumerated naturalization power under Article One, Section Eight, 
Clause Four of the Constitution, but also a large majority of 
immigration law and immigration-based procedure is based on 
statutes passed by Congress.94  However, Congress has also delegated 
a substantial amount of its authority to govern immigration law to the 
executive branch, which was ratified by various Supreme Court 
decisions.95 
2. Key Asylum Statutes Prior to the Trump 
Administration 
While initial forms of asylum law were created in response to 
the aftermath of World War II,96 the first federal statute that codified 
asylum and set firm guidelines for the asylum process is the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”).97  Prior to the 
implementation of the INA, there was a national quota system that 
preferred European immigrants.98  By eliminating the quota system, 
the INA gave rise to large-scale immigration that characterizes the 
modern wave of immigration.99  Another effect of eliminating the 
formal quota system, is the shift in immigration law to give 
preference to applicants who have family members currently in the 
United States rather than those lacking any ties to this country.100 
Along with the general foundational basis the INA provides, it 
deals specifically with asylum law in 8 U.S.C. § 1158.101  This part of 
the INA explains: (1) who has standing to apply for asylum and 
 
94 Id. 
95 See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678 (2001); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. 
Ct. 830 (2018); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
96 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
97 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-05, 51-61, 81-89, 1201-04, 21-31, 52-60, 81-88, 1301-06, 21-
30, 51-63, 1401-09, 21-59, 82-89, 1502-04, 21-24.   
98 Muzaffar Chishti, Fay Hipsman, & Isabel Ball, Fifty Years On, The 1965 
Immigration and Nationality Act Continues to Reshape the United States, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INSTIT. (Oct. 15, 2015), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/fifty-years-1965-immigration-and-
nationality-act-continues-reshape-united-states.   
99 Id.  There are still some versions of quotas in the current system present for 
certain types of family-based immigration, often referred to as “lotteries.”  Id. 
100 Chishti et al., supra note 98. 
101 8 U.S.C. § 1558.  This section is also labeled as § 209 of the INA. 
14
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exceptions to that general rule,102 (2) conditions of granting 
asylum,103 (3) the purpose of establishing and the process of 
terminating the status of asylum,104 and (4) the procedure involved in 
applying for asylum.105 
The next vital piece of asylum legislation, even though it did 
not directly address the issue of asylum, was the Refugee Act of 
1980.106  The Refugee Act introduces the key language in asylum 
determinations – a “well-founded fear of persecution.”107  While the 
language in this statute applies mainly to refugees, the immigration 
legal system uses the same language to determine the credentials of 
an asylum claim.108  
Another noteworthy piece of legislation that defined asylum 
law is the Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).109  While the INA and the Refugee Act of 
1980 both establish the scope of requirements for an asylum claim, 
the IIRIRA outlines the relevant factors and procedure involved in 
 
102 Id. at §1158(a). 
103 Id. at §1158(b).  These conditions include: eligibility, burden of proof, 
determination of credibility, exceptions to the general rules, and the treatment of 
parties that join the applicant in their application.  Id. 
104 Id. at §1158(c). 
105 Id. at §1158(d). 
106 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).  While refugees 
are very similar to asylum seekers, it is important to maintain each in a separate 
category because refugees are outside of the United States when they make their 
petition but asylum seekers are inside of the United States, or currently at a U.S. 
port of entry, when they make their petitions.  Refugees and Asylees, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-
statistics/refugees-asylees.  
107 94 Stat. 12. 
108 Refugee Act of 1980, NAT’L ARCHIVES FOUND., 
https://www.archivesfoundation.org/documents/refugee-act-1980 (last visited Sept. 
29, 2020). 
109 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997) [hereinafter IIRIRA].  While the 
IIRIRA provides a distinct set of rules, the actual piece of legislation was 
incorporated into the INA as part of Section 212.  See Memorandum from Donald 
Neufeld, Acting Associate Director Domestic Operations Directorate, Lori 
Scialabba, Associate Director, Refugee, Asylum and International Operations 
Directorate, & Pearl Chang, Acting Chief, Office of Policy & Strategy, 
Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections 
212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. 
Servs. (May 6, 2009). 
15
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deportation if asylum is not granted.110  The IIRIRA was designed to 
improve and heighten border control by imposing criminal penalties 
for certain crimes that are deemed to be removable offenses.111  
Specifically, there are two main provisions in this statute that are 
relevant to asylum seekers.112  First, the IIRIRA allows for the 
deportation of undocumented immigrants who commit a 
misdemeanor or a felony.113  Second, the IIRIRA mandates that 
immigrants who are unlawfully present in the United States between 
180 to 365 days must remain outside the United States for three years 
unless they are pardoned114  Furthermore, if they remain in the United 
States undocumented for over one year, they must stay outside the 
United States for ten years, unless they have a waiver.115  If an 
 
110 Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, LEGAL INFO. 
INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/illegal_immigration_reform_and_immigration_re
sponsibility_act (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).  This Act not only applies to asylum 
but also for other situations where an undocumented immigrant is removed for any 
reason.  Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See INA § 212(a)(9)(A), (B)(i)(I)-(II). 
113 Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110; 
see Kari Hong, The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
2067, 2074-75 (2017) (discussing the lack of distinction the IIRIRA makes 
between different levels of crimes).  This is important to note because one of the 
main reasons for denial of an asylum application is generally based on the applicant 
having a criminal background in the United States (no matter how remote, isolated, 
or minor of a crime it is).  Id.; 72 FR 53013 § 1513(e) (2007) (setting aside victims 
of crime and individuals seeking a U-visa as a class of non-deportable people).  
There is an exception for victims of a crime or victims of trafficking that were 
forced to commit crimes against their free will; however, the general rule is that 
anything on immigrants’ criminal records is a threat to their status in the country 
(especially when attempting to claim asylum).  Illegal Immigrant Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110. 
114 Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110; 
Conversation with Rajat Shankar formerly from Touro Law Center on Nov. 11, 
2020 at 9:30 AM EST.  This section of the IIRIRA is important for asylum seekers 
because asylum seekers need to be inside the United States (and their family 
members attaching to their petition must be inside the United States as well) in 
order for their asylum claim to be processed).  Id. 
115 Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110; 
Conversation with Rajat Shankar formerly from Touro Law Center on Nov. 11, 
2020 at 9:30 AM EST.  This ban can become a permanent bar to entry under the 
IIRIRA.  Id.  If someone has a three- or ten-year bar placed upon him or her and 
they still attempt to reenter the country, the immigrant can be facing a permanent 
ban from the country.  Id. 
16
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immigrant stays past the specified guidelines in the IIRIRA without 
obtaining the waiver or pardon, they must wait ten years before they 
can apply for a waiver.116 
The legislature has been the least active branch in establishing 
asylum law over the past couple of decades when compared to the 
actions of the executive and judicial branches.117  The major 
exceptions to this general rule come from the Bush118 and Obama119 
Administrations, which worked with Congress to issue temporary 
grants of citizenship to people who would otherwise not qualify for 
asylum, but still feared returning to their home countries.  
B. Supreme Court 
1. General Constitutional Power 
Out of the three branches of the federal government, the 
judiciary has the narrowest power to regulate immigration law under 
the Constitution.120  While the Constitution provides limited power to 
the judicial branch to create immigration law, the Supreme Court 
shaped federal immigration law in three key ways.  First, in the 
pivotal case of Chy Lung v. Freeman, the Court established that 
immigration regulation is a responsibility reserved solely for the 
 
116 Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110. 
117 D’vera Cohn, How U.S. Immigration Laws and Rules Have Changed Through 
History, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/09/30/how-u-s-immigration-laws-and-rules-have-changed-through-
history. 
118 Development, Relief, and Education for Immigrant Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th 
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter DREAM Act]. 
119 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-
childhood-arrivals-daca; President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents Program 
(DAPA), NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Nov. 26, 2014), 
https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-reform-and-executive-
actions/dapasummary. 
120 U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.  There is nothing mentioned in Article III that gives the 
Supreme Court original or appellate jurisdiction over asylum, or other general 
immigration, cases.  Id.  The only grant in the Constitution that comes close is the 
authority to have appellate jurisdiction over cases that “aris[e] under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their authority.”  Id. 
17
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federal government, not the individual states.121  Second, in the cases 
that followed Chy Lung, the Court helped define the scope of federal 
immigration powers by setting boundaries for the other two 
competing branches.122  Finally, the power of judicial review adds an 
important layer of protection for the immigrants going through the 
system, albeit in a limited fashion,123 in an attempt to ensure the 
immigration process is fair and accurate.124 
2. Major Cases Prior to the Trump 
Administration 
Prior to the Trump Administration, the Supreme Court 
decided five cases that shaped the form of current asylum law.125 
The Supreme Court directly addressed the modern-day 
concept of asylum-based immigration for the first time126 in INS v. 
 
121 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (holding it was unconstitutional for the 
California legislature to pass a law excluding certain immigrants, except upon 
payment of a bond, because the power to control admission of aliens belongs solely 
to the national government); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) 
(upholding the Chy Lung ruling). 
122 Vincent J. Cannato, Our Evolving Immigration Policy, NAT’L AFFS. (Fall 2012), 
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/our-evolving-immigration-
policy. 
123 Background on Judicial Review of Immigration Decisions, AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL (June 1, 2013), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/background-judicial-
review-immigration-decisions.  Congress has set up many restrictions on the types 
of arguments available for judicial review on appeal in immigration decisions.  Id.  
Some of these restrictions include the inability to challenge: “discretionary” 
determinations by immigration judges and officers, eligibility requirements for 
asylum, expedited removal proceedings, and cases where there is a criminal record 
(regardless of how minor the offense).  Id. 
124 Id. 
125 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 
U.S. 415 (1999); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 
U.S. 183 (2006); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010). 
126 While there are other earlier cases that mention asylum-based immigration, such 
as Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971), Cardoza-Fonseca is the first 
one to address asylum-based immigration as its own category (Rosenberg 
categorized the respondent’s claim as a refugee claim rather than a stand-alone 
asylum claim).  Rosenberg, 402 U.S. at 56.  See Deborah Anker, U.S. Immigration 
and Asylum Policy: A Brief Historical Perspective, 13 In Defense of the Alien 74, 
82 (1990) (referring to Cardoza-Fonseca as a “beacon” in the federal judiciary 
18
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Cardoza-Fonseca127 in 1987.  The respondent was a Nicaraguan 
citizen who entered the United States as a visitor and remained in the 
country longer than she was permitted.128  When deportation 
proceedings began, the respondent applied to withhold her order of 
deportation as well as for asylum.129  Her basis for asylum was that 
her brother was tortured due to his political beliefs and that the 
Sandinstas would persecute and torture her to discover her brother’s 
whereabouts if she returned to Nicaragua.130  The immigration court 
and the BIA held that the respondent did not establish a credible fear 
based on a “more likely than not” standard of proof.131  However, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the standard of proof 
to establish the credibility of an applicant’s fear of persecution should 
not be based on a typical percentage.132  Instead, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the more appropriate standard to judge an applicant’s fear of 
persecution is to evaluate whether the applicant has a “credible fear 
of persecution.”133  The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit's holding and determined that the BIA and lower immigration 
court both abused their discretion by applying the incorrect standard; 
therefore, this case was remanded to the lower courts for further 
proceedings based on the “well-founded fear of persecution” 
standard.134 
In 1999, the Supreme Court heard the next foundational case 
that specifically addressed asylum law – INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre.135  
The respondent was burning buses, assaulting passengers, and 
vandalizing private property in Guatemala, his native country.136  The 
respondent claimed that these acts were done to protest the 
Guatemalan government.137  He then sought asylum in the United 
 
approach to asylum policy after the lower courts slowly beginning to veer from the 
intended meaning of the INA). 
127 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
128 Id. at 424. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 424-25. 
131 Id. at 425. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 449. 
135 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
136 Id. at 418. 
137 Id. 
19
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States due to his expressed fear of persecution for his earlier political 
activities in Guatemala.138 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision, which held that the case should be remanded to the 
BIA for further factual analysis of three factors.139  The three factors 
the Ninth Circuit focused on were: (1) the balancing test between the 
severity of Aguirre’s offenses against the threat of political 
persecution,140 (2) the qualification of atrocities of Aguirre’s acts in 
comparison with others it faced in the past,141 and (3) the 
determination of whether Aguirre’s acts were politically necessary or 
successful.142  The Court dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s argument 
because neither the Attorney General nor the BIA is required to 
balance those factors under the INA since a grant of asylum is a 
discretionary judgment.143  Ultimately, the Supreme Court issued a 
unanimous ruling that the matter should be remanded to the circuit 
court for further proceedings to be analyzed using the proper 
methods, excluding the prior factors the Ninth Circuit originally 
considered.144  While the Court did not issue a definitive ruling in this 
case, Aguirre-Aguirre contributed immeasurably to the interpretation 
of asylum law.  Not only did this case grant the Attorney General and 
BIA great deference to enforce asylum law,145 especially when 
establishing the credible fear of political persecution, but this 
decision also further defined the scope of deportable offenses of a 
“serious nonpolitical crime” under the INA.146 
 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 423. 
140 Id. at 418. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 427-30.  While the UN handbook requires the balancing of those factors, 
especially requiring administrative agencies to “consider[] whether the acts 
committed ‘were grossly out of proportion to the alleged objective’. . . [t]he 
political nature of the offenses would be ‘more difficult to accept’ if they involved 
‘acts of an atrocious nature.’”  Id. at 428 (quoting Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d 
521, 524 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting U.N. Handbook, P152, at 36)).  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court says the handbook “may be a useful interpretive aid, but it is not 
binding on the Attorney General, the BIA, or the United States Courts.”  Id. at 427. 
144 Id. at 433. While the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the lower court that 
the case should be remanded for further proceedings, the Court did not agree with 
the Ninth Circuit’s rationale as to why it should be remanded.  Id. at 419. 
145 Id. at 424-25. 
146 Id. at 427-30. 
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/12
2021 LOCKING THE GOLDEN DOOR 1491 
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided INS v. Ventura.147  In this 
case, the respondent was seeking asylum for fear of persecution from 
the Guatemalan government and guerrilla forces.148  Following the 
reasoning in Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court held that asylum decisions 
are discretionary and administrative agencies, such as the INS, should 
be granted broad deference when making those decisions.149  
Additionally, while threats of danger were certainly elevated in 
Guatemala during this time,150 the Justices rejected the respondent’s 
asylum claims because “‘the underlying motivation in most asylum 
claims now appears to stem from common crime and/or personal 
vengeance,’ i.e. not politics . . . only party leaders or high-profile 
activists generally would be vulnerable to such harassment and only 
in their home communities.’”151  The Court believed that the 
respondent could return safely to his home country, just not his local 
community.152  By refusing to grant the respondent the immigration 
relief he requested, the Justices in Ventura established that an 
applicant must have a well-founded fear of persecution in order to 
have a successful asylum claim.153  While the concept of the “well-
founded fear of persecution” is not a new requirement to successfully 
establish an asylum claim,154 the Justices transformed the meaning of 
that terminology to grant a much broader sense of discretion to the 
government to cast doubt on an applicant’s credibility than the Court 
previously intended in Cardoza-Fonseca.155 
 
147 537 U.S. 12 (2002). 
148 Id. at 17-18. 
149 Id. at 16. 
150 Id. at 17-18. 
151 Id. (citing Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dept. of State, 
Guatemala -- Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions at 4, 8 (June 1997) 
(citation omitted)). 
152 Id. at 18.  It is not enough for an individual to have a fear of persecution to 
return to a specific area in his or her native country.  Id.  In order to establish a 
credible fear, the individual must fear persecution if forced to return to any part of 
his or her native country.  Id. 
153 Id. 
154 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449 (establishing the applicant’s “persecution 
or well-founded fear of persecution” as the necessary standard to evaluate the 
credibility of an applicant’s asylum claim). 
155 See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 13 (prioritizing the powers of the executive branch by 
having the first sentence of the opinion reference the broad discretion given to the 
Attorney General under the INA to evaluate the credibility of an applicant’s claim 
of persecution). 
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After Ventura, the Supreme Court did not issue another 
substantive asylum ruling until Gonzales v. Thomas156 in 2006.  In 
Gonzales, the respondents were a South African family seeking 
asylum in the United States.157  The respondents argued they should 
be granted asylum because they had a credible fear of persecution 
due to their political opinions and membership in a particular social 
group.158  The immigration and BIA courts focused mainly on the 
political and racial elements of their asylum claim and denied the 
respondents’ petition for asylum.159  However, the Ninth Circuit 
overruled the lower courts and held that the BIA failed to consider a 
family unit as a “particular social group” since “certain ‘kinship ties’ 
fall within the statutory term.”160 
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision due 
to the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous failure to remand the case for further 
proceedings on the issue of a “particular social group.”161  The 
Justices agreed that the central issue of the case, whether a family is a 
“particular social group” for the purposes of asylum, was not 
determined in the lower courts.162  While the Court did not issue a 
definitive ruling in this case as to whether a family is a “particular 
social group,” recent case law has interpreted this case and other 
 
156 547 U.S. 183 (2006). 
157 Id. at 184. 
158 Id.  The respondents argued the family collective constituted a “particular social 
group” because of their race and kinship with a particularly well-known, racist, 
white South African. Id.; Liliya Paraketsova, Why Guidance From the Supreme 
Court is Required in Redefining the Particular Social Group Definition in Refugee 
Law, 51 U. OF MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 437, 437-38 (2018).  Courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have struggled to define firm guidelines to establish a “particular 
social group.”  Id.  The BIA in Matter of A-B- helps provide some guidelines to 
identify “particular social groups”; however, these guidelines have been not as 
helpful in creating a straightforward procedure for application.  27 I&N Dec. 316, 
316 (A.G. 2018).  The court in Matter of A-B- held that a “particular social group” 
is: (1) based on a “common immutable characteristic” that is “socially distinct 
within the society in question,” (2) the “central reason for [his or] her persecution,” 
(3) stated with specificity, and (4) separate from the harm asserted in the 
application for asylum.  Id. 
159 Gonzalez, 547 U.S. at 184. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 185.  
162 Id. at 186-87. 
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lower court decisions to allow certain types of family units to fall 
under the statutory definition of a “particular social group.”163 
The last important asylum case decided prior to the Trump 
Administration was Kucana v. Holder164 in 2010.  The Court in this 
case upheld the power of judicial review in asylum cases that 
involved violations under the IIRIRA.165  In this case, the petitioner 
was a citizen of Albania who entered the United Stated in 1995 and 
did not leave when his visa expired, which is a deportable violation 
under the IIRIRA.166  While the Court regularly gave significant 
deference to the executive branch and Congress in issuing 
immigration-based decisions, the Justices in Kucana maintained that 
the separation of powers is fundamental and must be respected, 
especially when the judicial branch has significantly diminished 
power when compared to the executive and legislative branch.167 
C. The President 
1. General Constitutional Power 
The Constitution does not explicitly grant the executive 
branch any immigration-specific powers.168  However, the executive 
 
163 Andrew R. Arthur, Attorney General Sets Standards for ‘Family’ as a 
‘Particular Social Group’ and Reiterates His Authority to Interpret Immigration 
Laws, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Aug. 5, 2019), https://cis.org/Arthur/Attorney-
General-Sets-Standards-Family-Particular-Social-Group; see 27 I&N Dec. 581 
(A.G. 2019) (raising the bar to qualify as a “particular social group”).  While the 
Supreme Court has not clearly defined the term “particular social group,” the BIA 
has recognized certain clans and subclans as “particular social groups,” especially 
well-known families or those connected to well-known individuals.  Id.  However, 
most nuclear families are not inherently socially distinct.  Id.  Therefore, they do 
not qualify as “particular social groups.”  Id. 
164 558 U.S. 233 (2010). 
165 Id. at 249. 
166 Id. at 239-40. 
167 Id. at 237. 
168 There are some explicitly stated executive powers that have been interpreted to 
have immigration consequences.  Study Guide: The Rights of Refugees, supra note 
90.  One of these powers is the broad definition of the Article II, Section III power 
to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” seen in Zivotofsky v. Kerry by 
holding that the President has the power to recognize certain groups of people for 
purposes of immigration paperwork (which is inherent to their power to receive).  
See 576 U.S. 1 (2015).  Another one of these powers that have been interpreted 
broadly in favor of increased executive control in the realm of immigration law is 
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branch has acquired a great deal of power to control, monitor, and 
regulate immigration law through several channels created by the 
separation of powers among the branches of government.  First, as 
discussed in Sections IV(A)(1) and (2) of this Note, Congress has 
delegated much of its enumerated and inherent constitutional power 
to regulate immigration to the executive branch.169  Second, as 
discussed in Sections IV(B)(1) and (2) of this Note, the Supreme 
Court has regularly held in favor of a broad exercise of executive 
power when regulating the various areas of immigration law, 
especially domestic asylum law.170  Third, with the expansion of the 
administrative state, both the courts and Congress have given broad 
deference to agency decisions and have allowed a vast array of 
administrative policies as long as there is a legitimate purpose, which 
is not a high burden.171  Finally, the other branches have allowed the 
executive branch to enjoy an increased presence in immigration law 
by justifying their acquiescence under the language of the Take Care 
Clause of Article II, § 3 of the Constitution.172 
2. Key Executive Orders / Programs Before the 
Trump Administration 
There are three key presidential policies that helped define 
current asylum law prior to the Trump Administration.173   
Former President Carter passed The Consultation on the 
Admission of Refugees in 1980.174  This executive order serves, in 
 
the power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  Laura S. Trice, 
Adjudication By Fiat: The Need For Procedural Safeguards In Attorney General 
Review Of Board Of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 
1766-67 (2010) (discussing how the Attorney General, a key player in the 
executive branch, has broad discretion to enforce federal immigration laws under 
the current statutes). 
169 See supra notes 92-94, 122 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra notes 95, 120-67 and accompanying text. 
171 Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Couns., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
172 U.S. CONST. art. II, §3. 
173 Exec. Order. No. 12208, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,789 (Apr. 15, 1980); Memorandum 
from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 15, 2012); WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R45266, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S “ZERO TOLERANCE” IMMIGRATION 
POLICY (July 20, 2018).  
174 Exec. Order. No. 12208, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,789 (Apr. 15, 1980). 
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part, to amend sections of the INA and the Refugee Act of 1980.175  
Furthermore, this order creates powers in the executive branch to 
monitor refugee and asylum law in three variations.  First, the order 
allows the president to delegate certain types of immigration powers 
to the Secretary of State or Attorney General, both members of the 
President’s Cabinet.176  Second, the order grants the delegation of 
immigration oversight power to the United States Coordinator for 
Refugee Affairs, a member of the executive branch.177  Finally, the 
President reserved several asylum-centered rights for himself in the 
order including the ability to “specify special circumstances for 
purposes of qualifying persons as refugees under Section 
101(a)(42)(B) [of the INA]”178 and “to fix the number of refugees to 
be admitted under Section 207(b) [of the INA].”179 
The next two central pre-Trump executive programs 
addressing aspects of asylum law came from the Obama 
Administration through presidential memoranda.180  The first 
program is called “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect 
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children.”181  This 
program has also been referred to as the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) Program.182  Similar to DACA’s 
 
175 Id. at § 1-101(a)-(b).  These statutes have been previously identified by this Note 
as key statutes that guided the creation of United States asylum law.  See supra 
Section IV(A)(2). 
176 Exec. Order. No. 12208 at § 1-101(a). 
177 Id. at § 1-101(b). 
178 Id. at § 1-103(a). 
179 Id. at § 1-103(c).  
180 As mentioned previously in this Note, there is also the DREAM Act originating 
from the Bush, Jr. Administration in 2001.  Supra note 118.  However, this 
program will not be discussed in detail in this Note because it has not yet cleared 
the Congressional floor after at least ten versions of the bill.  The Dream Act, 
DACA, and Other Policies Designed to Protect Dreamers, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/dream-act-
daca-and-other-policies-designed-protect-dreamers. 
181 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 173.  
182 The Obama Administration issued a parallel program two years after DACA for 
the parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents – the Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) Program.  
However, this Note only addresses DACA in depth because: (1) DAPA was 
discontinued in 2017, (2) there are no present, or future, plans to reinstate the 
program, and (3) the DACA Program is essentially the same as the DAPA program 
(the only difference is that DACA applies to the children and DAPA applies to 
their parents).  See Rescission of Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for 
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predecessor, the DREAM Act, and DACA’s parental counterpart, 
DAPA, DACA is only meant to serve as a temporary solution that 
allows people who qualify for the program to stay in the country for a 
longer period of time than their status allows.183  This extra time then 
allows people in the program to apply for citizenship while they 
remain safe from deportation due to their provisional immigration 
status.184  While DACA, and the acts and programs similar to DACA, 
do not specifically address asylum law, they deal indirectly with 
asylum seekers.  Once a person is admitted to these programs, they 
can apply for more permanent forms of relief and a significant 
number of DACA recipients – or family members of DACA 
recipients – choose to file asylum claims due to the dangerous 
conditions in their native country.185  
The second Obama Administration program that addressed 
asylum was the Family Case Management Program (“FCMP”), 
which was issued in January 2016 as a pilot program.186  Unlike the 
other asylum policies and decisions discussed previously in this Note, 
the FCMP did not deal directly with the process of asylum or status 
of the applicant.  Instead, the FCMP provided alternatives to 
deportation for asylum seekers in several large cities throughout the 
United States.187  Some of these alternatives in the FCMP included 
 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (June 15, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providing-
deferred-action-parents-americans-and-lawful; ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R44764, THE DACA AND DAPA DEFERRED ACTION INITIATIVES: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2017).   
183 Memorandum on Preserving and Fortifying Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA), 2021 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. DCPD202100064 (Jan. 25, 2021). 
184 Doug Mentes, What Are the Options for DACA Recipients?, SUPER LAWYERS 
(May 21, 2020), https://www.superlawyers.com/oregon/article/what-are-the-
options-for-daca-recipients/61de5ce1-896b-4a7c-92d6-d0661c841bb0.html. 
185 Immigration Relief for DACA Recipients Based on Fear of Return, UNIV. OF 
CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF L. CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD. (Feb. 2018), 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/CGRS%20DACA%20Fear%20of%
20Return%20Claims%20Practice%20Advisory_02-28-2018.pdf. 
186 Jane C. Timm, This Obama-Era Pilot Program Kept Asylum-Seeking Migrant 
Families Together. Trump Canceled It., NBC NEWS (June 24, 2018, 8:54 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/obama-era-pilot-
program-kept-asylum-seeking-migrant-families-together-n885896. 
187 Report of the ICE Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/acfrc-report-final-
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providing “case management, referrals for support services, and legal 
orientation, in partnership with community-based non-governmental 
organizations, in order to make sure that vulnerable families’ most 
urgent needs were met and they had the information they needed to 
comply with legal obligations.”188  While the Trump Administration 
eliminated the FCMP in June 2017,189 the Biden Administration has 
already begun reversing some of former President Trump’s 
immigration policies;190 furthermore, President Biden has stated that 
a key priority in his immigration policy is to create a task force to 
reunite families191 – something that the FCMP was designed to do.192 
D. International Norms and Treaties 
Although this Note focuses on domestic law, our country’s 
asylum laws are certainly influenced by international norms and 
treaties.193  Therefore, a brief discussion of these sources of 
inspiration is necessary to understand the foundations of asylum law, 
especially the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 
(“Geneva Refugee Convention” or “Geneva Convention”)194 and the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
 
102016.pdf.  These five metropolitan areas include: Baltimore / Washington D.C., 
New York City / Newark, Chicago, Miami, and Los Angeles.  Id.  
188 Ruthie Epstein, The Tried-and-True Alternatives to Detaining Immigrant 
Families, ACLU (June 22, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-
rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/tried-and-true-alternatives-detaining. 
189 Report of the ICE Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers, supra 
note 187. 
190 Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Biden Issues Orders to Dismantle 
Trump’s ‘America First’ Immigration Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/us/politics/biden-immigration-executive-
orders-trump.html. 
191 Exec. Order No. 14011, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,273 (2021). 
192 See The Family Case Management Program: Why Case Management Can and 
Must Be Part of the US Approach to Immigration, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N 
(June 13, 2019), https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/research-
resources/the-family-case-management-program-why-case-management-can-and-
must-be-part-of-the-us-approach-to-immigration. 
193 While there are several sources of international influences on United States 
asylum law, this Note will focus on the two primary treaties that have formed the 
foundational backbone of domestic asylum law in the country – the Geneva 
Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Convention Against Torture of 1987.  
194 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES, G.A. Res. 2198(XXI) (1967). 
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Treatment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture” or 
“CAT”).195   
The Geneva Refugee Convention was first created in 1951 but 
was then amended in 1967.196  Similar to the Refugee Act of 1980, 
the Geneva Refugee Convention focuses on refugees and not 
asylees.197  However, three central aspects of the Geneva Convention 
are fundamental to the development of asylum law.  First, the Geneva 
Convention’s core principle of “non-refoulement, which asserts that 
refugee[s] should not be returned to a country where they face serious 
threats to their life or freedom,” has established international custom 
regarding the required treatment of those seeking safety in a foreign 
country.198  Further, American asylum law’s “fear of persecution” 
language mirrors the Geneva Convention’s stated policy to not force 
refugees to return to “a country where they face serious threats to 
their life or freedom.”199  Second, the definition used to define 
refugees and asylees in the Convention is very similar to the 
definition used in American asylum law – “someone who is unable or 
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”200  
Finally, while not stated explicitly in United States asylum law, the 
rights provided to those seeking refuge under the Geneva Convention 
establish an international standard of treatment, which those pushing 
for immigration reform in the United States seek to mirror in our 
country.201 
The Convention Against Torture was ratified and adopted by 
the U.N. General Assembly in 1984 and became effective in 1987.202  
 
195 U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR 
PUNISHMENT, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE]. 
196 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, supra note 194, at p. 1. 
197 Id. at “Preamble,” p. 13. 
198 The 1951 Refugee Convention, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2021). 
199 Id. 
200 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, supra note 194, at 
“Introductory Note,” p. 3. 
201 Id. at art. 3-5, 12-30 (discussing the rights of refugees, and those in the “same 
circumstances,” under the Geneva Convention). 
202 CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 195. 
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While the Geneva Convention is a persuasive international norm, the 
Convention Against Torture was formally adopted into United States 
immigration law through 8 C.F.R. § 208.16-208.18.203  Even though 
the Convention Against Torture provides broader protections than 
asylum, such as eliminating the defined groups for fear of persecution 
and allowing individuals with felony records to obtain protection, 
CAT has helped the development of asylum law in three ways.  First, 
CAT claims serve as alternative means to file claims that are 
unsuccessful under asylum.204  Although CAT requires torture or fear 
of torture from someone acting in an “official capacity” in the 
applicant’s home country,205 this program serves as a viable second 
option for those who do not fit within the rigid groups of people 
allowed to assert asylum claims.206  In this sense, the Convention 
Against Torture alleviate some of the burden on the asylum system 
and allows fewer asylum claims to place a strain on the already-
delayed asylum system.207  Second, CAT follows similar principles 
as the Geneva Convention which focuses on the inherent rights of 
individuals and upholds the belief that all individuals that fall under 
the Convention Against Torture are due universal respect as human 
beings.208  Finally, like the Geneva Convention, the Convention 
Against Torture reaffirms the concept that individuals should not be 
punished by a forced return to their countries when they reasonably 
do not feel safe to return.209  These guiding principles from CAT and 
the Geneva Convention, in turn, shape – at least in theory and in 
intention – American asylum law. 
V. ASYLUM DURING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
As stated previously in this Note, the executive branch has 
become the most active branch in regulating federal immigration 
 
203 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention Against Torture, 
Memorandum Addressed to the Regional Office for the United States of America 
& the Caribbean (Mar. 10, 2003), https://www.unhcr.org/5859a0464.pdf. 
204 Aruna Sury, Qualifying for Protection Under the Convention Against Torture, 
IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.ilrc.org/qualifying-
protection-under-convention-against-torture. 
205 CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 195, at art. 1. 
206 Sury, supra note 204. 
207 Id. 
208 CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 195. 
209 Id. 
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law.210  Former President Trump embraced the role of the executive 
branch’s expanding power within the realm of immigration law and 
was more active than the prior administrations combined in the 
field.211  Through the Trump Administration’s increased executive 
presence in immigration law, in conjunction with a more active 
Supreme Court,212 President Trump sought to regulate, reshape, and 
restrict immigration, especially asylum-based immigration, into the 
United States.213  Unlike this Note’s previous discussion of pre-
Trump asylum policies,214 this section will mainly focus on the 
executive and judicial branches’ actions during the years of the 
 
210 See supra Section IV(C)(1). 
211 Compare Drew DeSilver, Executive Actions on Immigration Have Long History, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/11/21/executive-actions-on-immigration-have-long-history 
(summarizing the eleven major immigration-based executive orders from 1961 to 
2014) with Document Search, FED. REG., 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/search (Write “immigration” in the 
search bar; then click “Advanced Search”; in the field that says “Document 
Category,” click on “Presidential Document”; then press the magnifying glass or 
search button) (showing the seventy-four immigration orders former President 
Trump  
issued in a single four-year term). 
212 Cases – Immigration and Naturalization, OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/issues/164 (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) (showing the sixteen 
Supreme Court decisions curtailing immigration in various ways during Trump’s 
four-year term to fourteen immigration decisions over the almost thirty-year period 
between the Reagan and Obama Administrations – with some administrations 
having no immigration-based Supreme Court decisions at all such as Presidents 
Clinton and Bush, Sr.). 
213 Even though the Trump Administration has had a significant impact in many 
areas of immigration law, similar to previous sections of this Note, the focus of this 
discussion will be on policies having an impact on asylum law.  Other areas of the 
immigration law that President Trump was very active in include employment-
based immigration (through his “America First” agenda), visa requirements 
(imposing stricter requirements to obtain a visa as well as ending the diversity visa 
lottery), green card requirements (eliminating eligibility for those deemed to be a 
“public charge”), supporting for-profit detention centers, and an attempt to remove 
foreign students from the United States during the pandemic.  See, e.g., Amadu 
Jacky Kaba, United States Immigration Policies in the Trump Era, 9 SOCIO. MIND 
316 (2019); Kandel, supra note 173; Stuart Anderson, A Review of Trump 
Immigration Policy, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/08/26/fact-check-and-review-of-
trump-immigration-policy/?sh=1ec1d25f56c0. 
214 See supra Section IV. 
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Trump Administration.215  Also, to demonstrate the increase in 
activity before and after the COVID-19 pandemic, this section will 
divide the years of the Trump administration based on when the 
World Health Organization officially declared the virus as a 
pandemic in March of 2020.216 
A. Before COVID-19 (November 2016 – February 
2020) 
1. Supreme Court Decisions 
During the four years of the Trump Administration, several 
cases reached the Supreme Court regarding immigration law and five 
cases have restricted asylum in accordance with President Trump’s 
executive policies.217  The two important Court cases decided before 
the pandemic were Jennings v. Rodriguez218 and Trump v. Hawaii.219  
In Jennings v. Rodriguez, respondent, Alejandro Rodriguez, 
was a Mexican citizen who was a legal permanent resident of the 
United States.220  In April 2004, Mr. Rodriguez was convicted of 
drug and theft crimes.221  Due to these convictions, the federal 
government sought to remove the respondent from the country 
pursuant to the protocol in the Immigration and Nationality Act.222  
After over three years of detention, Rodriguez filed a habeas petition 
claiming that his continued detention without an individualized bond 
 
215 This section will not address the actions of Congress during the Trump 
Administration because Congress was largely inactive in immigration law during 
this period (other than hosting debates on some executive proposals).  See 
Catherine Rampell, Trump Has Bulldozed Over Congress on Immigration. Will 
Lawmakers Ever Act?, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2019, 7:09 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-has-bulldozed-over-congress-on-
immigration-will-lawmakers-ever-act/2019/11/14/67401466-0722-11ea-8292-
c46ee8cb3dce_story.html.   
216 Domenico Cucinotta & Maurizio Vanelli, WHO Declares COVID-19 a 
Pandemic, 91 ACTA BIOMEDICA 157, 157 (2020). 
217 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 
(2018); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020); Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Guerrero-
Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020). 
218 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
219 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
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hearing was a violation of his due process rights.223  The respondent’s 
habeas claim was consolidated with other individuals’ claims similar 
to his, most of the other claimants being non-citizen asylum 
seekers.224  After becoming certified as a class, Rodriguez and the 
other complainants alleged that the prolonged detention in ICE 
centers, without clear and convincing evidence that such detention is 
warranted,225 constituted a violation of their constitutional rights.226  
The district court granted a preliminary injunction which required the 
government to provide each member of the class a bond hearing 
unless the government could show, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that continued detention was justified.227  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court but limited the 
guarantee of a bond hearing to only those who were detained at least 
six months.228 
In a plurality opinion by the Court,229 the Justices reaffirmed 
the large grant of authority to the executive branch regarding issues 
of immigration, detention, and removal.230  The Court specifically 
relied on the Attorney General’s broad decision-making power in 
immigration cases.231  The Court justified the Attorney General’s 
immense scope of power within the field of immigration by reasoning 
that the default rule of the alien detention and expedited removal 
statute232 is to allow the Attorney General to have the power to issue 
warrants for the arrest and detention of aliens pending the outcome of 
their removal proceedings.233  While there are a few limited 
exceptions, the applicability of these exceptions is also left to the 
 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 838-39. 
225 Id. at 839.  Examples of when a prolonged detention is warranted include if the 
detainee is a flight risk, involved in the witness protection program, or a danger to 
himself / herself or others.  Id. at 848.  
226 Id. at 861. 
227 Id. at 839. 
228 Id.  This limitation did not matter for members of this specific class, because 
they all met the qualification of being detained for at least six months.  Id. 
229 Justice Alito wrote the opinion of the Court.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy joined Alito’s opinion in full.  Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined the 
opinion with the exception of the discussion regarding the Court’s jurisdiction in 
this case. 
230 Id.  
231 Id. 
232 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-26. 
233 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837. 
32
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/12
2021 LOCKING THE GOLDEN DOOR 1503 
discretion of the Attorney General.234  The Court further held that the 
lower courts improperly applied the constitutional-avoidance 
canon235 by over relying on Zadvydas v. Davis in order to impose a 
time limit to require a bond hearing; meanwhile, the plain language 
of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-26 makes no such mention of this 
requirement.236 
While this case focused primarily on bond hearings for 
detained aliens, it also had a significant impact on asylum law in two 
important ways.  First, Mr. Rodriguez and many other detained 
members of the class applied for asylum and were currently facing 
removal proceedings.237  As discussed earlier in this Note, the 
removal procedures for a failed asylum claim are just as fundamental 
in shaping asylum law as the qualifications for the program itself.238  
Therefore, the Court’s review of the applicability and language of the 
alien detention and expedited removal statute is relevant to asylum 
law under the Trump Administration.239  The language of § 1225(b) 
of the statute separates the removal and detention process for asylum 
seekers whose cases are still pending from aliens in other 
categories.240  However, the Court in this case grouped both types of 
individuals together and held that, under § 1226 of the alien detention 
and removal statute, that: (1) neither group is entitled to a bond 
hearing regardless of the length of detention,241 (2) bond hearings are 
 
234 Id. at 839 (referencing 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) which states that exceptions will be 
granted “‘only if the Attorney General decides’ both that doing so is necessary for 
witness-protection purposes and that the alien will not pose a danger or flight 
risk”). 
235 Id. at 836.  The constitutional-avoidance canon allows a court to frame statutory 
language that is subject to multiple interpretations in a way that avoids 
interpretations that have the potential to raise serious constitutional problems.  Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 859-60. 
238 See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the 
IIRIRA in shaping asylum law through establishing comprehensive removal 
procedures). 
239 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 870. 
240 See id. at 844-45 (discussing the statutory distinction between removal of aliens 
seeking asylum under 8 U.S.C. §1225 (b)(1) and removal of aliens not seeking 
asylum under § 1225 (b)(2)). 
241 Id. 
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not constitutionally guaranteed for either group,242 and (3) both 
groups are eligible to be placed in expedited removal proceedings.243 
Four months after the Court’s holding in Jennings, the 
Justices issued another ruling in Trump v. Hawaii that had a large 
impact on asylum law.244  The petitioners in this case challenged 
Executive Order Nos. 13,769 and 13,780, which were issued by 
President Trump in February and March of 2017, respectively.245  
These proclamations suspended the entry of individuals for ninety 
days for those coming from seven countries that had been previously 
identified as heightened terrorism risks.246  While the Court said 
multiple times throughout the opinion that these proclamations do not 
apply to asylum seekers,247 Justice Breyer’s dissent also highlighted 
2018 statistics from the State Department that show that this self-
labeled Muslim ban248 does have a significant curtailing effect on 
asylum and refugee seekers from these countries.249  The majority 
opinion upheld these policies under the rational basis standard 
because of the expansive powers given to the federal government in 
regulating immigration250 and because of the immigration and 
national security issues involved in the issuance of these 
proclamations.251  Furthermore, the Court attempted to distinguish 
this broad grant of power to the executive branch from the polarizing 
ruling in Korematsu v. United States.252  Both cases deal with the 
intentional targeting of specific groups of people for the generalized 
purpose of “national security;” however, the Court in Trump v. 
Hawaii said that individuals who are U.S. citizens receive different 
 
242 Id. at 845. 
243 Id. at 837. 
244 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2431 (2018). 
245 Id. at 2403-04. 
246 Id. at 2403.  The seven countries included in this ninety day ban are Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.  Id. (referencing Executive Order No. 
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 § 3(c) (2017)). 
247 Id. at 2406, 2422. 
248 David J. Bier, A Dozen Times Trump Equated His Travel Ban with a Muslim 
Ban, CATO INST. (Aug. 14, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/dozen-
times-trump-equated-travel-ban-muslim-ban (discussing twelve separate occasions 
when President Trump explicitly referred to these proclamations as a “Muslim 
ban”). 
249 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2431. 
250 Id. at 2415. 
251 Id. at 2417. 
252 Id. at 2423. 
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treatment from people who are seeking entry into the country but do 
not have any status in the country yet.253  Along with the 
discriminatory effect this case has on asylum seekers from targeted 
countries, this case affects asylum law because it reaffirms the broad 
delegation to the executive branch in the field of immigration, 
including issues affecting asylum applicants – either directly or 
indirectly.254 
2. Executive Orders / Formal Presidential 
Statements 
Former President Trump led the most active administration 
regarding the executive branch’s role in implementing immigration 
policies.255  While many Trump administration executive orders and 
presidential memorandums focused on restricting immigration as a 
whole, four main official executive policies affected asylum-based 
immigration.256 
The first of these executive policies was the executive order 
called “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 
Improvements,” which was issued on January 25, 2017.257  In this 
executive order, President Trump sought to secure the southern 
border through a variety of tactics including manning the border with 
more federal agents,258 terminating the practice of “catch and 
release,”259 and encouraging streamlined deportation proceedings.260  
 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 2415. 
255 See N.Y. Times Editorial Board, Trump’s Overhaul of Immigration is Worse 
Than You Think, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/10/opinion/sunday/trump-immigration-child-
separations.html; Todd Schulte, Tearing Families Apart – The Impact of Trump’s 
Immigration Agenda, FWD.US (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.fwd.us/news/the-
impact-of-trumps-immigration-agenda; Aline Barros, How Trump Administration 
Dramatically Reshaped US Immigration Policy, VOICE OF AM. (Oct. 22, 2020, 9:18 
PM), https://www.voanews.com/usa/immigration/how-trump-administration-
dramatically-reshaped-us-immigration-policy. 
256 Exec. Order 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (2017); Exec. Order 13,768, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8,799 (2017); Exec. Order 13,888, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,355 (2019); Migrant 
Protection Protocols, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols. 
257 Exec. Order 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (2017). 
258 Id. at § 8. 
259 Id. at § 6.  The order characterizes “catch and release” as a procedure “whereby 
aliens are routinely released into the United States shortly after their apprehension 
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Furthermore, this statement affirmatively stated a goal of this 
administration is to reduce the amount of asylees and refugees 
entering the country.261  The order specifically targeted asylum, and 
its partner program – refugee admission, by claiming asylees and 
refugees “abuse” the system by looking for loopholes in the removal 
guidelines.262  Trump’s order not only directly affected asylum law 
through the intentional targeting of the program, but also unilaterally 
granted more authority to the executive branch to carry out 
immigration enforcement, especially by granting more power to 
border patrol agents and ICE agents. 
The next of Trump’s pre-COVID executive policies that had a 
negative effect on asylum arose from another executive order issued 
on January 25, 2017, called “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior 
of the United States.”263  Unlike the first executive order discussed in 
this section, this order does not have specific language targeting 
asylees or refugees.  Instead, one of the main goals of this order was 
aimed at dismantling sanctuary cities and removing undocumented 
immigrants who stayed in these cities.264  Even though asylum is not 
mentioned specifically by name in this executive order, the attack on 
sanctuary cities was a tough hit to asylees.  The term “Sanctuary 
City” has a direct connection to asylum-based immigration.265  The 
term originated when the sanctuary movement started in the 1980s to 
accommodate Salvadorians trying to escape the 1970s civil war for 
fear of political persecution.266  Sanctuary cities serve multiple 
purposes to provide a safe refuge for undocumented immigrants 
 
for violations of immigration law.”  Id.  However, that is a mischaracterization of 
the procedure. “Catch and Release”: Frequently Asked Questions, JUST. FOR 
IMMIGR., https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigrant-
detention/catch-and-release-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).  
While it is true that some apprehended immigrants are released, they are only 
temporarily released pending their immigration court proceedings, which are still 
monitored by DHS.  Id. 
260 Exec. Order 13,767, supra note 257 at §§ 2(b)-(d). 
261 Id. at § 11(a). 
262 Id. at § 11, 11(a). 
263 Exec. Order 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (2017). 
264 Id. at §§ 1, 9. 
265 Rawle Andrews Jr. & Sanchita Bose, Sanctuary Cities?  Asylum?  Dreamers?  
When a House is Not a Home:  The Legal and Socioeconomic Implications of 
National Populism on Local Governance and Individual Liberties, 21 UNIV. OF 
D.C. L. REV. 75, 85 (2019). 
266 Id. 
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while giving them time to process their immigration claims.267  Some 
of the policies these locations enforce in order to maintain a safe 
environment for undocumented immigrants include prohibitions on 
ICE arrests without a judicial warrant, unrestricted sharing of 
immigration status with police and other city workers, and local 
police cooperation with ICE to increase detentions.268  This safe 
space is vital to asylum seekers because asylum applicants are 
already seeking refuge from a dangerous situation in their home 
country.269  By restricting access to these welcoming areas, the 
Trump Administration made it much harder for asylum seekers to 
assimilate into the country with ease and bide their time in a location 
where they are not actively facing a life or death situation as they 
wait, potentially for years, for their applications to process.270 
The third initiative by the executive branch that attempted to 
tear down asylum-based immigration was the Migrant Protection 
Policy (“MPP” or the “Remain in Mexico Policy”).271  The MPP was 
a DHS initiative created by President Trump which states that 
individuals attempting to cross the southern border without 
documentation will be returned to Mexico and forced to wait outside 
of the United States for the duration of their immigration 
proceedings.272  This program was extremely detrimental to asylum 
seekers because they are met with one of two options when they try 
to enter through the southern border to flee serious persecution.  First, 
they will be turned around at the border and forced to return to their 
home country.273  Or, second, they could choose to remain in 
 




269 See supra notes 10, 47 and accompanying text. 
270 See generally Andrews & Bose, supra note 265 (discussing the overall 
importance of sanctuary cities to undocumented immigrants and the overall effects 
of President Trump’s executive order trying to eliminate them). 
271 Vanessa Romo, U.S. Supreme Court Allows ‘Remain in Mexico’ Program to 
Continue, NPR (Mar. 11, 2020, 6:48 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/03/11/814582798/u-s-supreme-court-allows-remain-in-
mexico-program-to-continue. 
272 Migrant Protection Protocols, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols.  
273 MPP is Still Happening – And There’s a New Threat, REFUGEE & IMMIGR. CTR. 
FOR EDUC. & LEGAL SERVS. (Oct. 19, 2020), 
37
Karpman: Locking the Golden Door
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021
1508 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
inhumane conditions in Mexico while they wait for months, if not 
years, to hear anything about their immigration court proceedings.274 
The final policy this Note will discuss from this portion of the 
Trump Administration is the executive order issued on September 26, 
2019, called “Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee 
Resettlement.”275  This policy went somewhat hand in hand with 
MPP in that it outsources immigrants to locations outside of the 
United States.  The main difference between MPP and this executive 
order was that MPP is more focused on punishment and detention 
whereas this order tries to revive the “safe third-country 
agreements.”276  However, these agreements are problematic for 
asylum seekers – especially those from Central American 
countries.277  This is because individuals seeking asylum due to 
persecution from gang member violence and political violence in 
these countries could easily be sent back home to the dangerous 
conditions they were facing, especially since Guatemala, Honduras, 
and El Salvador all had “safe third country agreements” with the 
United States during the Trump Administration.278 
B. Post COVID-19 (March 2020 – January 2021) 
1. Supreme Court Decisions 
Once COVID was labeled as a pandemic, the Supreme Court 




274 Q&A: Trump Administration’s “Remain in Mexico” Program, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Jan. 29, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/29/qa-
trump-administrations-remain-mexico-program. 
275 Exec. Order 84 Fed. Reg. 52,355 (2019). 
276 Id.  While this order does not mention the third country agreements specifically, 
it talks about resettlement to other locations and countries that would be “best 
environment for refugees.”  Id.  This is also the stated language when it comes to 
the justification for the third country agreements. 
277 Peniel Ibe, The Dangers of Trump’s "Safe Third Country" Agreements in 
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cases in less than a year.279  Aligning itself with the Trump 
Administration’s executive limitations placed on immigration and 
asylum, the Supreme Court issued two central rulings that severely 
impacted asylum applicants over the span of eleven months280 – 
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam281 and 
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of 
California.282 
The Supreme Court in Thuraissigiam evaluated the issue of 
whether an asylum seeker can file a petition for habeas corpus to 
challenge the legality and constitutionality of his detention.283  In this 
case, respondent, Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Tamil from Sri 
Lanka, entered the United States through the southern border.284  
Shortly thereafter, the respondent was detained for expedited 
removal.285  Mr. Thuraissigiam tried to assert an asylum claim; 
however, the asylum officer rejected his credible-fear claim – a 
decision that was upheld by a supervising officer and the immigration 
judge.286  In response to this denial, the respondent filed a motion for 
habeas corpus in federal district court in order to obtain a new 
opportunity to apply for asylum.287  In his petition, Mr. Thuraissigiam 
asserted that he had a credible fear of persecution, and therefore 
qualified for asylum, due to his minority group ethnicity and political 
views.288  While the district court dismissed the petition, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision and held 
that the respondent’s expedited removal without a grant of habeas 
corpus violated his constitutional rights.289 
 
279 Review of the Supreme Court’s 2019-2020 Immigration Cases, NAT’L IMMIGR. 
F. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://immigrationforum.org/article/review-of-the-supreme-
courts-2019-2020-immigration-cases. 
280 Similar to other sections in this Note, this section will only discuss asylum cases 
or cases that have a direct or indirect impact on asylum applicants.  Therefore, 
while the Court has decided several other immigration cases during this time, they 
will not be discussed here.  See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020); Guerro-
Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020); Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020). 
281 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). 
282 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). 
283 Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1981. 
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The Justices, in a 7-2 opinion, with only Justices Sotomayor 
and Kagan dissenting, ruled in favor of the Department of Homeland 
Security and held that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that 
expedited removal proceedings violated the Suspension Clause and 
Due Process Clause.290  Therefore, the case was reversed, remanded, 
and accompanied with directions that the habeas corpus claim should 
be dismissed.291  When evaluating the legitimacy of the Suspension 
Clause claim, the Court looked at the historical meaning and intent of 
habeas corpus under the language of the Suspension Clause in Article 
1, Section 9, Clause 2.292  Using a strict interpretation of habeas 
corpus, the Court quickly dismissed Thuraissigiam’s Suspension 
Clause claim, since he stated that the purpose of his habeas petition 
was to obtain a new chance to file for asylum, not to specifically 
challenge the legality of his detention.293  Furthermore, the Justices 
held that the ability to challenge the finality of the immigration 
officials’ decision was not a valid reason to invoke a habeas corpus 
petition for a non-citizen and instead was a misinterpretation of 
Supreme Court finality decision precedent.294  As to the respondent’s 
Due Process claim, the majority opinion held that: (1) Mr. 
Thuraissigiam is not a citizen and therefore does not require the same 
level of due process granted to citizens295 and (2) even though non-
citizens are granted due process rights under the Fifth Amendment 
and statutory requirements of due process, the respondent received 
the required amount of due process from the administrative and 
executive decisions made by federal officers acting under the 
authority of Congress.296  Justices Breyer and Ginsburg also wrote a 
noteworthy concurring opinion which warned that the Court’s 
holding should be applied narrowly.297  Finally, Justices Sotomayor’s 
and Kagan’s dissent argued that this decision essentially makes 
asylum determinations by the executive branch unreviewable, 
 
290 Id. at 1983. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. at 1975. 
293 Id.  
294 Id. at 1975-82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the respondent’s 
misapplication and overgeneralization of “finality era” such as Nishimura Ekiu v. 
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)). 
295 Id. at 1982. 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 1988-89.  
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granting a problematic amount of unchecked power to a single 
branch.298 
Although this case dealt mainly with the constitutionality of 
expedited removal proceedings, or lack thereof, Thuraissigiam 
affected asylum law in several ways.  Most prominently, 
Sotomayor’s dissent highlights a common theme throughout Supreme 
Court precedent that addresses immigration law – cede power to the 
executive branch.299  By upholding the constitutionality of an 
expedited removal procedure without requiring the applicant to be 
heard in court, the Court showed its dedication to delegate broad 
decision-making authority to immigration officials and the executive 
branch.300  While the IIRIRA, the statute containing the applicable 
expedited removal procedures in this case, intends to protect asylum 
seekers who have a credible fear of persecution, this decision chipped 
away at the little procedural protections asylum seekers have to 
defend themselves from arbitrary abuses of power by the federal 
government.301  Since Thuraissigiam did not specifically challenge 
the legality of his detention, instead choosing to challenge the legality 
of the asylum officer’s decision to deny his asylum petition – which 
directly caused his detention – the Court found that he was not 
entitled to relief.302  This rigid approach when it applies the law to 
noncitizens is extremely harmful to asylum applicants who are 
already in a difficult situation when confronted by immigration and 
federal officials.303  Finally, the Court reaffirmed the notion that 
noncitizens, such as asylum seekers, lack many of the constitutional 
and legal protections available to citizens.304  This negatively impacts 
those applying to seek refuge in this country because they are not 
treated as “people” deserving full due process under the language of 
the Fifth Amendment, rather they are harshly characterized as 
 
298 Id. at 1993. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 1963. 
302 Id. at 1975. 
303 Not only are the confronted aliens already in a rough situation by having to 
escape a life or death situation at home, they faces notable hurdles in the United 
States immigration system.  Some of the struggles for immigrants involved in 
asylum decisions have been discussed in earlier sections of this Note.  See supra 
Section III.   
304 Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982. 
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“aliens” – which has the potential for mistreatment in their 
proceedings. 
While Thuraissigiam was the central asylum-based decision 
by the Court during the post-COVID Trump period, Department of 
Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California affected 
asylum indirectly by addressing the constitutionality of the DACA 
and  DAPA programs305 – programs that are linked to asylum.306  
Several groups of plaintiffs challenged former Secretary of Homeland 
Security Elaine Duke’s June 2017 decision to rescind the DACA and 
DAPA programs in June 2017.307  Each of the plaintiffs won at the 
district court level, and the federal government appealed the various 
district court decisions to the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits.308  
Before judgment, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for 
certiorari.309  When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in all of 
the government’s petitioned cases.310 
In its 5-4 decision in Regents, the Court upheld the DACA 
program on the ground that the sudden decision to rescind the 
program was a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”).311  While this case dealt with immigration relief, the Court 
held that the INA did not apply to the DHS’s decision to rescind the 
DACA program because the parties did not challenge any removal 
proceedings.312  The Court found that the DHS acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in rescinding DACA;313 however, the Court majority 
failed to find any animus in the Department’s policy.314  Due to this 
lack of animus, the Court held the door open to potential later 
challenges of DACA, as long as the challenger followed the proper 
procedures under the APA.315  
2. Executive Orders / Formal Presidential 
 
305 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1905. 
306 See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text. 
307 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901. 
308 Id. at 1902-05. 
309 Id. at 1905. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 1915. 
312 Id. at 1907. 
313 Id. at 1915. 
314 Id. at 1916. 
315 Id. at 1919. 
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Statements 
Even more than the first three years of the Trump 
Administration, when the issue of COVID-19 reached the United 
States, former President Trump became extremely forward in stating 
his intentions to restrict immigration into the country as much as 
possible.  By hiding under the guise of national security and the 
health and welfare of individuals due to the pandemic, which will be 
discussed later in this Note,316 former President Trump issued 
sweeping executive orders and memorandums barring practically 
every group of immigrants due to the increased health risk of 
traveling in and out of the country.317  A list of these groups includes, 
but is not limited to: workers,318 students,319 individuals from specific 
countries,320 and certain visa groups.321  The broad ban placed on 
general immigration procedures also indirectly affected asylum 
applicants.  First, the placement of these restrictions forcibly stopped 
the UCSIS’s application processing system – putting a halt not only 
to these specific groups but to the entire immigration process.  
Considering the already lengthy asylum process, the Trump 
 
316 See infra Section VII. 
317 Nick Miroff, Maria Sacchetti, & Tracy Jan, Trump to Suspend Immigration to 
U.S. for 60 Days Citing Coronavirus Crisis and Job Shortage, but Will Allow Some 
Workers, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2020, 5:01 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/coronavirus-trump-suspend-
immigration/2020/04/21/464e2440-838d-11ea-ae26-989cfce1c7c7_story.html. 
318 See Proclamation 10052, 82 Fed. Reg. 38263 (2020); Proclamation 10014, 85 
Fed. Reg. 23441 (2020). 
319 Jill Filipovic, Trump Administration’s Planned Purge of Students Serves a Cruel 
Purpose, CNN (July 22, 2020, 1:18 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/07/opinions/ice-online-learning-college-
international-students-filipovic/index.html. 
320 See Proclamation 10041, 85 Fed. Reg. 38263 (2020) (excluding immigrants 
attempting to come into the country from countries such as Hong Kong, Macau, 
Iran, the UK, Brazil, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lichtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland); see also Immigration Policy Updates, 
U. OF CAL MERCED, https://iss.ucmerced.edu/immigrationpolicyupdates (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
321 Trump Extends Covid-Related Visa Ban; Health Coverage Policy Advances, 
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Administration’s imposition of additional roadblocks only served to 
further delay the process.322  Also, many people seek to obtain other 
types of temporary visas to come to the United States in order to 
escape their situation while they look for more permanent forms of 
immigration relief.323  
On December 10, 2020, in his final days of office, former 
President Trump also tried to pass a “Death to Asylum” Rule;324 
however, that rule was ultimately challenged and struck down after 
twenty-two attorneys general from across the country challenged 
these pending regulations through amicus briefs to their local state 
and federal courts.325  While this rule was ultimately struck down in 
January 2021,326 the brazenness of this proposed rule shows how bold 
and confident the Trump Administration was, especially former 
President Trump himself and the executive branch, in their ability to 
shape asylum law into whatever it wanted using whatever language it 
pleased.  In this 128 page document, former President Trump 
attempted to create “insurmountable procedural barriers, evidentiary 
burdens, and qualification standards to prevent . . .  groups . . . from 
being able to exercise their right to seek and enjoy asylum in the 
United States.”327  With the exception of the “Death to Asylum” rule, 
which was never passed, President Biden has since reversed each of 
 
322 Nina Narahari, ‘The Backlog is Just Going to Get Bigger’: COVID-19 in the 
Asylum Process, DAILY CAL. (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.dailycal.org/2020/05/06/the-backlog-is-just-going-to-get-bigger-
covid-19-in-the-asylum-process. 
323 See Dual Intent Visas and the Concept of Nonimmigrant Intent Explained, 
CITIZENPATH (Jan. 21, 2020), https://citizenpath.com/dual-intent-visas. 
324 85 Fed. Reg. 80274 (2020). 
325 Nancy Kelehar, Legal Challenge to Trump’s “Death to Asylum” Regulations 
Creates Hope, HUM. RTS. PULSE (Jan. 19, 2021), 
https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/legal-challenge-to-trumps-
death-to-asylum-regulations-creates-hope. 
326 Sabi Ardalan, Court Blocks Illegal “Death to Asylum” Rule, HARV. IMMGR. & 
REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM (Jan. 9, 2021), 
https://harvardimmigrationclinic.org/2021/01/09/breaking-court-blocks-illegal-
death-to-asylum-trump-rule. 
327 Bill Frelick, The Trump Administration’s Final Insult and Injury to Refugees, 
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former President Trump’s policies which directly attack asylum that 
are mentioned in this Note.328 
VI. WAS THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S APPROACH TO 
ASYLUM CONSTITUTIONAL? 
During his four years in office, former President Trump did 
not make it a secret that he does not approve of the asylum program 
and thinks the program is an illegitimate immigration loophole.329  
Even though this Note argues that former President Trump’s attempts 
to effectively eliminate asylum-based immigration were certainly in 
violation of essential constitutional principles, that does not 
necessarily make those actions illegal, or even unconstitutional.  As 
previously emphasized throughout this Note, the executive branch 
has received an enormous amount of immigration power through 
delegation from the legislative and judicial branches.330  On one 
hand, with essentially carte blanche to handle immigration however 
that particular administration sees fit, the President can issue asylum 
policies even if they infringe upon traditional constitutional values 
such as the separation of powers or the protection of individuals’ 
constitutional rights.  On the other hand, just because the executive 
branch is allowed to act the way it has, this does not mean that the 
constitutionality of its actions should not be questioned.   
 
328 Migrant Protection Protocols, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/migrant-protection-protocols (Aug. 25, 2021, 12:01 AM) 
(reversal of MPP); Exec. Order 14,013, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,839 (Feb. 4, 2021) (reversal 
of “Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement”); Exec. 
Order 13,993, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,051 (Jan. 25, 2021) (reversal of “Border Security and 
Immigration Enforcement Improvements”).  While President Biden has reversed 
the executive orders discussed in this Note that specifically attack asylum, some of 
the COVID immigration regulations that targeted overall immigration into the US, 
therefore placing burdens on asylum, have still been kept intact.  See COVID-19 
Travel Restrictions and Exceptions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULATE 
AFFS., https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-
resources/covid-19-travel-restrictions-and-exceptions.html (Sept. 15, 2021). 
329 See, e.g., Exec. Order 13,767, supra note 257; @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER 
(Sept. 11, 2019, 8:23:15 PM), 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22asylum%22; 
@realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (July 30, 2019, 6:43:52 AM), 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22asylum%22. 
330 See supra Sections IV(C), V(A)(2), V(B)(2). 
45
Karpman: Locking the Golden Door
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021
1516 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 37 
A. Separation of Powers Issues  
The framers of the Constitution created the three separate 
branches of government in a checks and balances system in order to 
avoid having one branch that is overly powerful and essentially 
unchallengeable.331  However, the extreme amount of delegation to 
the President, where Congress and the Court have essentially given 
all of their immigration decision-making power to the executive 
branch, is a highly problematic violation of this founding principle.332 
The branch with the highest degree of constitutional authority 
to regulate all matters of immigration law is the legislature, where 
according to Article 1 Section 8, Congress has the power to establish 
a “uniform Rule of Naturalization” under Clause 4.333  However 
throughout the years, Congress has expressly or impliedly delegated 
almost all of its authority to soundly form immigration law to the 
President and the executive branch.334  Furthermore, the Court has 
endorsed this extremely broad delegation and granted a significant 
amount of discretion to key players in the executive branch, such as 
the President and the Attorney General.335  An example of the 
problematic nature of this uncontrolled expansion of presidential 
power is how President Trump regularly used the INA to unilaterally 
tear down asylum.336  While excessive delegation is a problem that 
spans across many areas of government and is not unique to only the 
Trump Administration, this method used by former President Trump 
is especially ironic because: (1) the INA was a work of Congress, (2) 
the INA was instrumental to the creation of asylum, and (3) President 
Trump intentionally used this specific act to destroy the very thing 
that Congress originally had the power to establish and regulate under 
the Constitution.337 
 
331 Checks and Balances, HISTORY (Dec. 4, 2020), 
https://www.history.com/topics/us-government/checks-and-balances. 
332 See Live at the National Constitution Center, The President and Immigration 
Law, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/podcast/the-president-and-immigration. 
333 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8 cl. 4. 
334 See supra Section IV(A)(1); see also Adam B. Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, The 
President and Immigration, 119 YALE L. J. 458 (2009). 
335 See supra Section IV(B). 
336 See, e.g., Proclamation 10043, 85 Fed. Reg. 384353 (2020). 
337 Id. 
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One issue at the heart of the separation of powers conflict 
between the legislative and executive branches is the classification of 
immigration law as either domestic or foreign law.  While 
immigration law definitely has its roots in both foreign and domestic 
law,338 it is important to make this distinction, because the label 
placed on asylum law helps to define the scope of the President’s 
constitutional power.  According to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,339 the President has 
unprecedented power in the realm of foreign affairs.340  Not only 
have foreign affairs traditionally been an executive field of law, 
passed directly from the Crown to the President,341 but also Congress 
grants more deference to the President to shape foreign law because, 
as Head of State, he is the central voice of the nation.342  While the 
President has plenary powers to shape U.S. foreign policy or 
international law, this power should be defined through a narrow 
scope.  Often times throughout modern American history, Presidents 
have observed the power disparity the executive branch has in 
shaping foreign versus domestic law and, therefore, have tried to 
frame issues that are truly domestic in nature as international or 
foreign issues.343  Despite the creative framing utilized by the 
executive branch, courts should look at these cleverly disguised 
issues through the lens of a domestic executive policy.344  The Court 
held in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer345 that the executive 
power in “foreign” issues that have largely domestic roots, such as 
 
338 See supra Section IV. 
339 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
340 Id. at 319-20 (“It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone 
with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but 
with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations.”). 
341 Id. at 316. 
342 Id. at 316-17.  The Court establishes the President’s role in this capacity by 
discussing how the different states are not sovereign nations and, therefore, do not 
engage in international negotiations.  Id. 
343 See Harlan Cleveland, The Internationalization of Domestic Affairs, 442 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 125 (1979). 
344 Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J. L. & 
POLITICS 1, 13-14, 19-21 (2000). 
345 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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labor disputes in the steel industry during a current war, is notably 
less than the President’s actual foreign policy power.346 
Former President Trump’s framing of immigration, especially 
asylum law, fits very well within the Youngstown Sheet – Curtiss-
Wright conflict.  While immigration law includes many domestic 
elements,347 the executive branch, especially under the Trump 
Administration, has shifted the dynamic of asylum law to the debate 
of “us versus them.”348  By focusing on looking outward, rather than 
addressing the internal dynamics of our immigration system or 
population, immigration law has taken the role of a foreign policy 
issue due to national security concerns from outside countries.349 
Another issue concerning the Trump Administration’s 
usurpation of immigration power by the executive branch involves a 
potential breach of the nondelegation doctrine – which has made a 
resurgence in the current Supreme Court.350  Even though this was 
seemingly an outdated doctrine of the Lochner Era, the arrival of 
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett – two originalists – joining other 
originalist Justices currently on the bench, such as Justices Thomas 
and Roberts, could signal the revival of nondelegation.351  The 
 
346 Id. at 641-43 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
347 Harold Fields, Immigration-A Domestic or an International Problem?, 156 
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 41 (1931) (discussing the domestic 
nature of immigration law and how it has the potential to be viewed as an 
international issue). 
348 Arash Emamzadeh, The Psychology of “Us-vs-Them,” PSYCH. TODAY (Aug. 9, 
2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/finding-new-home/201908/the-
psychology-us-vs-them. 
349 Id.; Kimmy Yam, How Biden Can Undo the Divisions Trump Deepened in 
Immigrant Communities, NBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2021, 1:20 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/how-biden-can-undo-divisions-
trump-deepened-immigrant-communities-n1256228; Tara Wu, The Long History of 
Blaming Immigrants in Times of Sickness, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 19, 2020), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/long-history-blaming-
immigrants-times-sickness-180976053. 
350 Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 286-87 (2021); William D. Araiza, Toward a Non-Delegation 
Doctrine That (Even) Progressives Could Like, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, 
https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme-court-review/toward-a-non-
delegation-doctrine-that-even-progressives-could-like (last visited Apr. 5, 2021). 
351 See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Non-Delegation Doctrine 
Returns After Long Hiatus, SCOTUS BLOG (Dec. 4, 2014, 8:00 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/scotus-for-law-students-non-delegation-
doctrine-returns-after-long-hiatus; Edward H. Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial 
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principal two-part theory behind the nondelegation doctrine is that: 
(1) neither Congress nor the President can change the form or 
function of the Constitution352 and (2) the Supreme Court is the final 
arbiter of the Constitution.353 
Both Congress and the Court are disrupting the goals and 
means of the nondelegation doctrine both through the passive role 
they have recently taken in immigration law, as well as through their 
overly broad express delegations of authority to the executive branch.  
For example, by taking more of a passive role in recent asylum 
law,354 Congress is allowing the President and his executive branch to 
commandeer quasi-legislative functions, especially through the ease 
and speed of which immigration-based executive orders are passed 
and implemented.  Additionally, the Court has impliedly delegated 
quasi-judicial functions to the executive branch as well by allowing 
the President and Attorney General to serve as judge, jury, and 
executioner in expedited removal cases for denied asylum seekers.355 
Third, Congress and the Court during the Trump 
Administration have bypassed the issue of a balance of powers 
among the branches by expressly granting an enormous amount of 
power and discretion to the executive branch to make immigration 
decisions.356  The Supreme Court regularly held that members of the 
executive branch, especially the President and Attorney General, 
have ultimate discretion to issue final asylum decisions and that these 
decisions are largely unreviewable.357  Meanwhile, Former President 
Trump sought to take advantage of § 212(f) of the INA – an express 
delegation of carte blanche removal power to the President – to 
institute policies such as his Muslim ban and the Remain in Mexico 
 
Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 34 J. L., ECON., & ORG., 27 (2018); 
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 350; Araiza, supra note 350; Nondelegation’s 
Unprincipled Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1132 (2021). 
352 See William N. Eskridge Jr. & Neomi Rao, Article I, Section 1: General 
Principles, CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/interpretation/article-i/clauses/749 (last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
353 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1958). 
354 Melanie Nezer, An Overview Of Pending Asylum and Refugee Legislation In 
The US Congress, 2 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 121, 121 (2014). 
355 See supra Sections IV(B), V(A)(1), V(B)(1). 
356 See supra Section V. 
357 Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive?  National Security and the 
Limits of Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731 (2017). 
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Program.358  This broad grant of unreviewable, or at the very least 
highly discretionary authority, is contrary to the intended purpose of 
the founders when they created our federalist democracy – to keep 
each branch of equal power so one branch does not dominate the 
others.359 
Finally, it is important to mention that former President 
Trump also informally expanded the presence of the executive branch 
past its constitutional limits.  In his capacity as administrative head of 
federal agencies, under his “Take Care” power,360 former President 
Trump regularly implemented and encouraged policy decisions that 
made it significantly harder for asylum seekers during his four-year 
term.  Three of these policies include the: closure of UCSIS offices 
across the country,361 imposition of a monetary fee for asylum 
applications,362 and increased use of ICE to rapidly increase 
detentions and expedite deportations.363  These unilaterally instituted 
informal policies create a conflict between the branches similar to the 
issues raised in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.364  Here, 
 
358 Stuart Anderson, How to Limit a President’s Power Over Immigration, FORBES 
(June 8, 2020, 12:07 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/06/08/how-to-limit-a-presidents-
power-over-immigration/?sh=19fa8ac92531. 
359 See supra notes 331-35 and accompanying text. 
360 U.S. CONST. art. II, §3.  The Take Care power says that the President has the 
power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  Id.  This has been 
interpreted to include the power of the President to make sure government agencies 
are properly implementing and administrating the laws issued by the executive 
branch.  Powers Derived from the “Take Care” Duty, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-3/powers-derived-
from-the-take-care-duty (last visited Feb. 27, 2021). 
361 USCIS Temporarily Closing Offices to the Public March 18 – April 1, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-temporarily-closing-offices-to-the-public-
march-18-april-1; USCIS Office Closings, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 
(Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/uscis-office-closings.  Offices 
have been closed across the country for over a year and have only begun to start 
opening to full capacity.  Id.  Furthermore, emergency operations were closed 
nationwide from March 19, 2020 to June 4, 2020.  USCIS Offices Prepare to 
Reopen on June 4, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-offices-preparing-to-reopen-on-june-4. 
362 See infra notes 401-04 and accompanying text. 
363 Franklin Foer, How Trump Radicalized ICE, THE ATL. (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/trump-ice/565772. 
364 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (discussing the three categories of presidential action as it relates to 
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there was no express delegation to former President Trump to create 
the informal policies he did.  With that said, former President Trump 
still managed to sneak in additional policies that further increased the 
executive branch’s sphere of influence regarding immigration law 
while making it harder for asylum seekers to come to and stay in this 
country.  One of these informal policies even involved changing the 
requirements for an asylum application, something that is squarely in 
the jurisdiction of the legislative branch.365 
Through these formal and informal actions, former President 
Trump has greatly expanded the presence of the executive branch in 
not only enforcing, but also shaping and interpreting immigration law 
to the detriment of the other branches. 
B. Issues Involving Individuals’ Constitutional Rights 
Many of the immigration policies initiated by the executive 
branch violate individual rights under the Constitution.  Even though 
non-citizens are not granted full protection under the Constitution, 
they are protected by several Constitutional rights.366  While there are 
many categories of rights allocated to both non-citizens and citizens 
 
the President’s relationship to Congress on the issue).  Here, Congress’s silence as 
presidents continue to seize power in immigration law would likely fall under 
Category Two – the limbo land.  Id. at 637.  In this category, it is important to 
justify the President’s actions only by analyzing his Article II powers.  Id.  This is 
because the President neither acted with the express authority of Congress (which 
would give the President authority under Article I to do what he is doing as well) 
nor did he act specifically against what Congress said (which would severely 
weaken the President’s power under Article II by subtracting whatever 
Congressional powers under Article I are in direct conflict with the President’s 
actions).  Id. at 637-39. 
365 BEN HARRINGTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46142, THE POWER OF CONGRESS 
AND THE EXECUTIVE TO EXCLUDE ALIENS: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES (2019).   
366 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (upholding the right of illegal 
aliens to receive a public education); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) 
(upholding the integrity of the family unit as a fundamental right of all people, not 
just citizens); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (upholding due process 
rights for all people, not just citizens).  But see Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
N.R.L.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (holding that undocumented immigrants are not 
entitled to the same employment protections as citizens are); Pereira v. Sessions, 
138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) (holding that paperwork for a Notice to Appear in 
immigration court need not adhere to the same standards of notice required by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to citizens). 
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alike,367 this section of the Note will focus primarily on violations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses, because those are the most applicable to the Trump 
Administration’s asylum policies. 
The relevant language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is that “any State [shall not] deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”368  By 
distinguishing this part of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies 
to “any person,” from the rest of section 1, which applies only to 
citizens of the United States, the plain language of the Constitution 
guarantees due process and equal protection rights to everyone, 
including undocumented immigrants and asylees.369 
There were several times in the Trump Administration’s 
“Zero Tolerance” policy that former President Trump tried to restrict 
asylum applicants’ constitutional rights as much as possible.  
Specifically, there were three notable demonstrations of the Trump 
administration’s assault on asylum which were challenged on 
constitutional grounds – the ruling in Trump v. Hawaii, the ruling in 
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, and the Remain 
in Mexico Program. 
The constitutionality of former President Trump’s actions was 
on full display in Trump v. Hawaii due to the discrimination of the 
Muslim ban and its apparent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause.  Normally, policies that discriminate on the 
basis of national origin or alienage370 receive strict scrutiny – 
 
367 See Ilya Somin, The Constitutional Rights of Noncitizens, LEARNLIBERTY (Apr. 
30, 2017), https://www.learnliberty.org/blog/t-he-constitutional-rights-of-
noncitizens; Gretchen Frazee, What Constitutional Rights Do Undocumented 
Immigrants Have?, PBS (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-constitutional-rights-do-
undocumented-immigrants-have (discussing the scope of non-citizens’ rights to due 
process, legal counsel, family integrity, vote or hold office in local elections, 
education, and protection from unreasonable searches and seizures). 
368 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
369 Rachel Stockman, Yes, ‘Illegal Immigrants’ Do Have Constitutional Rights 
Even Under Trump’s New Immigration Plan, L. & CRIME (Feb. 22, 2017, 8:36 
AM), https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/yes-illegal-immigrants-do-have-rights-
under-trumps-new-immigration-plan. 
370 The distinction between national origin and alienage is often hard to make; 
however, the Court has tended to look at national origin from the perspective of 
United States citizens and alienage from the perspective of non-citizens.  Alienage 
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meaning “the law must advance a compelling state interest by the 
least restrictive means available.”371  However, there are exceptions 
to the strict scrutiny analysis, including discriminatory actions taken 
by the federal government to protect national security.372 
While the Court used this exception to hold that the Muslim 
ban was constitutional, even though it was facially discriminatory on 
the basis of alienage, the Court recognized the similarity between this 
case and Korematsu v. United States, tried to distinguish the two 
cases as much as possible, and failed.373  Both Trump v. Hawaii and 
Korematsu deal with facially discriminatory policies by the federal 
government on the basis of alienage and national origin.374  Also, 
both cases justify their holdings by referencing the President’s power 
to protect national security.  In its failure to learn from history, the 
Court in Trump v. Hawaii issued a troublesome ruling that granted 
carte blanche to the federal government as long as it comes up with a 
good excuse for its deprivations of peoples’ fundamental 
constitutional rights. 
Meanwhile, the Court’s ruling in Thuraissigiam and Former 
President Trump’s Remain in Mexico Policy both demonstrate clear 
examples of the Trump Administration’s violation of asylum seekers’ 
constitutional right to due process – especially their rights to petition 
for habeas corpus and to have their day to be heard in court.375  
VII. WAS COVID-19 THE PERFECT SCAPEGOAT TO USE? 
In the wake of one of the most severe pandemics in recent 
memory, almost every country across the world shut down to some 
 
and Nationality, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-
conan/amendment-14/section-1/alienage-and-nationality (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).   
371 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984). 
372 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (using the language of the 
rational basis test to apply to issues involving discrimination based on alienage 
such as “facially legitimate for a bona fide reason”). 
373 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
374 Id. at 2447-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  One should realize that there were other 
concerns, outside of discrimination regarding immigration, in both cases – 
especially Trump v. Hawaii – including religion as well as due process and equal 
protection for U.S. citizens; however, for the purposes of this Note, the discussion 
of both cases focuses on issues of discrimination on the basis of alienage. 
375 See supra Sections V(A)(2), (B)(1). 
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degree.376  The reason for these policies was two-fold – (1) stop, or at 
least slow down, the spread of the disease in their country and (2) 
protect domestic economies as much as possible that were affected by 
mandatory global shutdowns.377   
However, former President Trump saw another opportunity 
brought by the pandemic shutdowns.378  For the first three years of 
his administration, he demonstrated his strict dedication to his Zero 
Tolerance immigration policy and to eliminating any forms of 
migratory relief that do not adhere to that policy, such as asylum.379  
As other countries restricted immigration-based entry, the Trump 
Administration rapidly issued many executive orders and policies to 
negatively impact asylees and refugees.380  Not only did former 
President Trump follow suit with other leaders by restricting the 
number of immigrants allowed into the country, he instituted 
universal travel bans – both related to country of origin and type of 
immigration.381  One of the travel bans specifically targeted asylum 
and ordered the complete stop to the processing of asylum applicants 
trying to enter through the southern border.382  At the same time, 
former President Trump thrived on the culture of fear surrounding the 
COVID-19 pandemic and escalated the number of detentions and 
expedited deportations during his final nine months in office.383  
Finally, for individuals who were currently processing asylum claims, 
former President Trump issued a massive shutdown of the entire 
immigration court system384 – the effects of which are still being felt 
 
376 Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resources, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/topics/coronavirus (last visited Mar. 28, 2021). 
377 Jack Herrera & Quito Tsui, Could Covid-19 Mean the End of Asylum Law in the 
United States?, THE NATION (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/coronavirus-refugee-asylum-law. 
378 Sarah Pierce & Jessica Bolter, Dismantling and Reconstructing the U.S. 
Immigration System: A Catalog of Changes under the Trump Presidency, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (July 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-
immigration-system-changes-trump-presidency. 
379 See supra Section V(A). 
380 See supra note 320. 
381 See supra notes 320-21; see also Pierce & Bolter, supra note 378. 
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over a year later, as there are still no in-person immigration 
proceedings in several major locations as of June 17, 2021.385 
While the Trump Administration was not subtle in its 
immigration objectives throughout the entire term, Former President 
Trump was granted more leeway to control immigration under the 
general label of “public health and safety.”386  By masking these 
clearly discriminatory policies targeting individual groups of 
immigrants under the guise of protecting American health, former 
President Trump pushed most of his asylum initiatives forward 
without pushback from Congress, the Court, or a significant portion 
of the American public.387 
VIII. DIRE NEED FOR SERIOUS IMMIGRATION REFORM 
“Comprehensive immigration reform” is a term that frequents 
campaign platforms during election years, because many Americans 
agree that the immigration system is “badly broken and in urgent 
need of reform.”388  However, while there is a consensus that 
immigration reform is necessary, the complex and highly politicized 
nature of immigration law makes it hard for Americans to come 
 
385 Conversation with Judge Alice Segal from the New York Immigration Court on 
Sep. 22, 2020 at 5:30 PM EST; Operational Status Map, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir-operational-status/operational-status-map (last visited 
June 17, 2021).  While many locations are now open as of June 17, 2021, there are 
some locations that are still fully closed as of the date of visiting the website such 
as Houston – Greenspoint Park and Louisville.  Id.  There are also locations that are 
only open for limited purposes.  For example, these locations are open for filings 
only (not for any hearings): Houston – South Gessner Road, Memphis, New York – 
Broadway, and Otay Mesa (San Diego).  Id.  There are also locations that are 
currently only allowing detained hearings (with most of these locations resuming 
non-detained hearings on July 6, 2021) including: Dallas, El Paso, Fort Snelling 
(Minnesota), Guaynabo (San Juan), Harlingen (Texas), Houston, Kansas City, New 
York – Federal Plaza, New York – Varick, and Portland.  Id. 
386 How the Trump Administration is Using COVID-19 to End Asylum, INT’L 
RESCUE COMM. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.rescue.org/article/how-trump-
administration-using-covid-19-end-asylum. 
387 Id. 
388 Focusing on the Solutions: Key Principles of Comprehensive Immigration 
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together on a universal policy to help improve the system.389  This 
section will focus on four goals of immigration reform that have an 
impact on asylum law.390   
A. Goals of Immigration Reform 
1. Create a direct, fair, and inclusive path to 
citizenship 
The overarching goal is to provide a “direct, fair, and 
inclusive path to citizenship for immigrants in the U.S. without 
papers.”  Within this objective, there are three smaller tasks.  First, 
the government needs to make the process more transparent and less 
complicated for immigrants to follow by providing a straightforward 
set of rules and easily applicable procedures.  Second, it is important 
that the federal government establishes flexible alternative channels 
for immigration other than the formalized system already in place.  
Finally, it is important for the government to remove some of the 
additional barriers imposed on asylum that other countries do not 
have, such as the asylum application processing fee of fifty dollars.391   
Furthermore, the entire asylum process is extremely technical 
and complicated.  As demonstrated earlier in this Note, even the 
Justices of the highest court in the country have struggled to provide 
clear definitions for qualifications under asylum law.392  Also, the 
process is not accommodating to asylees whatsoever because it is 
incredibly intimidating for applicants.  Currently, the asylum 
procedure follows a rigid process that does not leave much room for 
applicants to explain their individual circumstances.393  Other than an 
initial confrontation with a border patrol officer, the only times 
asylum applicants can share their story before being thrust into court 
 
389 James F Hollifield, What Makes Immigration Reform So Hard, GEORGE W. 
BUSH INST. (Winter 2018), 
https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/immigration/hollifield-immigration-
reform.html. 
390 There are other areas in immigration law that are referenced when notions of 
immigration reform are brought up – especially labor law, family-based 
immigration, and temporary visas.  However, this Note will mainly focus on goals 
that have a direct or indirect impact on asylum law. 
391 85 Fed. Reg. 87,251 (Dec. 18, 2020). 
392 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
393 See supra Section III. 
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proceedings are in the I-589 Application and one sixty-minute 
interview with an ICE or USCIS official.394  However, this is 
insufficient to determine what the applicant has endured. 
Moreover, a study in 2017 found that 72% of refugees at 
arrival, and 58% after five years, are below basic in English 
literacy.395  Another 18% of refugees at arrival and 25% of refugees 
are only at a basic level of English proficiency after five years in the 
United States.396  Only 6% of refugees at arrival, and 18% after five 
years, are actually proficient in the English language.397  Thus, if 
applicants are forced to explain their entire life stories in a form that 
requires a specially trained immigration attorney to complete, even 
for native English speakers, they are placed at a significant 
disadvantage.  Then, after that, they wait for months, if not years, 
after they filed their original application to talk to an immigration 
representative for only a single hour.398  Both the form and the 
interview pose themselves as very scary situations for the applicant 
and create an inherent lack of fairness in a process where people feel 
they are intimidated by the federal government the entire time.  Also, 
when an undocumented immigrant is discovered in the U.S. – even 
one who is currently applying for asylum – there are very few options 
available to them to obtain legal status.399  Their only options are to 
succeed in their asylum claim, which is very difficult to do, or try to 
obtain residency before they are detained and deported, an even more 
difficult task if their asylum claim is denied.400 
Finally, additional barriers to obtain asylum that are not in the 
original system, but are now imposed by the federal government, do 
not make the process any easier.  One of the additional barriers 
imposed by the Trump Administration on asylum applicants is the 
new fifty dollar processing fee for asylum applications.401  Only four 
 
394 See supra Section III. 
395 Jason Richwine, Rough Estimates of Refugee Literacy, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://cis.org/Richwine/Rough-Estimates-Refugee-Literacy. 
396 Id. 
397 Id. 
398 See supra Section III. 
399 David J. Bier, Reforming the Immigration System: A Brief Outline, CATO INST. 
(Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.cato.org/study/reforming-immigration-system-brief-
outline. 
400 See id. (discussing the inflexibility of the immigration system and the problem 
of the all-or-nothing approach when it comes to undocumented immigrants). 
401 85 Fed. Reg. 87,251 (Dec. 18, 2020). 
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countries in the world, including the United States, currently charge 
asylum applicants a fee.402  Even though fifty dollars does not seem 
like much of a burden to an average American, this fee is sometimes 
an insurmountable problem for asylum seekers who are already 
fleeing from dangerous situations in their home countries and often 
have no money when entering the country.403  Furthermore, the little 
money asylum seekers may have does not go very far in the United 
States due to the conversion rate of their domestic currencies.404 
2. Decrease ICE’s role in exchange for 
increasing the EOIR’s presence 
The second goal is to reform the enforcement of immigration 
laws.  This involves both the necessary change to ICE’s policies as 
well as the creation of an independent immigration court system that 
is not attached to the executive branch.  Similar to the rationale 
behind defunding the police in an aim at reformation,405 requests are 
regularly made across the country to defund ICE and to engage in 
more targeted, less cruel immigration enforcement.406  Paired with 
 
402 Jessica Sutherland, Only Three Nations in the World Charge Asylum Seekers a 
Fee.  Trump Wants the U.S. to be the Fourth, DAILY KOS (Nov. 9, 2019, 2:40 PM), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2019/11/9/1898288/-Only-three-nations-in-the-
world-charge-asylum-seekers-a-fee-Trump-wants-the-U-S-to-be-the-fourth.  The 
other three countries are Fiji, Australia, and Iran.  Id. 
403 See Ryan Baugh, Annual Flow Report – Refugees and Asylees: 2020, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 2020), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-
statistics/yearbook/2019/refugee_and_asylee_2019.pdf (giving the top ten home 
countries of asylum applicants and each country has a lower exchange rate when 
compared to the United States dollar). 
404 See id. 
405 Michael Schwirtz & Ali Watkins, Why the $6 Billion N.Y.P.D. is Now a Target 
of ‘Defund the Police,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/28/nyregion/nypd-budget-defund-police.html. 
406 See Defund Hate, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR., 
https://immigrantjustice.org/issues/defundhate (last visited Mar. 28, 2021); Beth 
Hallowell, How to Talk About Defunding ICE and CBP—and Investing in 
Communities, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (July 14, 2020), 
https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/how-to-talk-about-defunding-
ice-and-cbp-and-investing-communities; Julian Resendiz, Activists Want Biden to 
Defund ICE, Overhaul Migrant Detention Policies, BORDER REP. (Jan. 22, 2021, 
3:32 PM), https://www.borderreport.com/hot-topics/immigration/activists-want-
biden-to-defund-ice-overhaul-migrant-detention-policies; Kari Hong, 10 Reasons 
58
Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/12
2021 LOCKING THE GOLDEN DOOR 1529 
this initiative to reduce the role of ICE in immigration enforcement is 
to allow immigration courts to stand on their own feet.  Right now, 
immigration courts are directly under the Department of Justice and 
function almost as administrative courts out of the Executive Office 
of Immigration Review (“EOIR”).407  Furthermore, the executive 
branch maintains additional control over the immigration courts 
because adjudications by the EOIR are squarely “under delegated 
authority from the Attorney General.”408  By creating an independent 
immigration court system that looks more like the judiciary rather 
than an adjudicative forum of an executive agency, there will no 
longer be an inherent conflict of interest between the court and the 
Attorney General.409  Furthermore, this will help to correct the severe 
imbalance of powers between the executive and judicial branches in 
the field of immigration law by removing some adjudicative control 
from the executive branch.410 
 
3. Change focus in creating available facilities 
to immigrants 
Third, there should be an overhaul of the facilities available to 
immigrants to treat them more humanely as they undergo the asylum 
process.  This involves: the removal of ICE detention centers, the 
promotion of sanctuary cities, and the reinstatement of the USCIS 
offices that were closed during the Trump Administration in response 
to the pandemic. 
First, ICE detention centers are inhumane facilities.411  There 
are not only problems of overcrowding at detention centers,412 but 
 
Why Congress Should Defund ICE’s Deportation Force, 43 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 40 (2019). 
407 Executive Office for Immigration Review – About The Office, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office. 
408 Id. 
409 Katie Shepherd, Calls for Independent Immigration Court Grow Louder at 




411 New Report Shines Spotlight on Abuses and Growth in Immigrant Detention 
Under Trump, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/30/us-new-report-shines-spotlight-abuses-and-
growth-immigrant-detention-under-trump; David J. Bier, Are CBP’s Filthy and 
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ICE detainees also have a severe lack of access to: showers, space to 
sit or lay down, toilets, sanitary products, air conditioning or heat, 
sleeping materials, water, food, and adequate medical care.413  Due to 
unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, and inadequate medical care, 
ICE detention facilities have a significantly higher risk of COVID-19 
outbreaks – even with the underreported numbers given by ICE 
officials.414  Finally, ICE detention centers are extremely costly to 
maintain; therefore, eliminating these facilities provides a financial 
benefit as well as a humanitarian one.415 
Second, sanctuary cities are vital to provide refuge to asylum 
seekers who are looking to immediately flee dangerous situations in 
their home countries.416  Not only are these areas safer environments 
for immigrants than their home countries, these cities are remarkably 
low in crime across the board – despite what members of the Trump 
Administration said to sway the public opinion against these areas.417 
Finally, by reopening USCIS offices and resuming their full 
functionality, it will immeasurably help asylum applicants in two 
main ways.  Reopening these offices to full capacity would alleviate 
the backlog of immigration cases in the system and asylum claims 
could be processed at a faster rate.  Also, the provision of more 
offices will make the asylum application process much easier for 
asylum seekers because they will not have to travel as far to be 
interviewed. 
 
Inhumane Immigrant Detention Camps Necessary?, CATO INST. (July 3, 2019, 
3:01 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/are-cbps-filthy-inhumane-immigrant-
detention-camps-necessary. 
412 Bier, supra note 411.  Detention centers have at times held between four to five 
times the amount of people they are designed to hold.  Id. 
413 Id. 
414 Noelle Smart & Adam Garcia, Tracking COVID-19 in Immigrant Detention – A 
Dashboard of ICE Data, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Nov. 18, 2020), 
https://www.vera.org/tracking-covid-19-in-immigration-detention; Letter by Parsa 
Erfani et. al., COVID-19 Testing and Cases in Immigration Detention Centers, 
April-August 2020 (Oct. 29, 2020), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2772627. 
415 Vaishnavi Vaidyanathan, How Much It Costs ICE to House Immigrants in 
Detention Centers, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018, 1:24 AM), 
https://www.ibtimes.com/how-much-it-costs-ice-house-immigrants-detention-
centers-2731743. 
416 See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text. 
417 Natalie Delgadillo, The Surprising Cost of Sanctuary for Progressive Cities, 
GOVERNING (May 9, 2018), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-sanctuary-
cities-trump-libby-schaaf.html. 
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4. Guarantee of legal representation – carrying 
Gideon to non-citizens 
Finally, in order to ensure fairness in the immigration process, 
immigrants and undocumented individuals applying for legal 
immigration status, should be guaranteed the right to an attorney as a 
constitutional right in all proceedings.  Asylum applicants are 
allowed to have an attorney present with them in their USCIS 
interviews.418  However, the right to an attorney is not guaranteed in 
all immigration proceedings.419  Most notably, immigrants are not 
entitled to an attorney once their case reaches the immigration 
court.420  However, facing similar, if not greater, consequences to 
personal liberty as a criminal proceeding,421 individuals applying for 
legal immigration status or currently in court for formal immigration 
proceedings should be able to obtain competent legal representation 
by right.422 
B. What President Biden Has Already Done in 
Furtherance of These Goals 
One of President Biden’s main campaign issues was centered 
around fixing the destruction the Trump Administration caused to 
immigration – stating that “Trump has waged an unrelenting assault 
on our values and our history as a nation of immigrants.  It’s wrong, 
and it stops when Joe Biden is elected president.”423  On the 
campaign trail, President Biden vowed not only to revive old Obama 
immigration policies, such as DACA, he also specifically stated he 
 
418 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
419 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
420 See Manuel, supra note 61. 
421 These severe consequences include not only the deprivation of liberty through 
detention, similar to a criminal case, but also detention in less humane conditions 
than a prison and the risk of deportation. 
422 See John Oliver, Immigration Courts: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver 
(HBO), YOUTUBE (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fB0GBwJ2QA (highlighting the lack of 
adequate legal representation in court proceedings as a central issue in immigration 
courts). 
423 Joe Biden & Kamala Harris, The Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a 
Nation of Immigrants, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/immigration (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
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would revive programs that former President Trump tried to tear 
down – including asylum.424 
During his time in office so far, President Biden has not 
disappointed on that promise.  First, President Biden issued several 
executive orders directly targeting and seeking to overturn Former 
President Trump’s actions to limit asylum.425  Some of the initiatives 
of these reforms to the prior administration’s immigration policy 
include: a top-down review of executive agencies in charge of 
administering immigration law,426 ordering the specific revival of the 
asylum system and review of problematic Trump policies such as 
MPP,427 and increasing the presence of humanitarian aid programs 
for immigrant populations in need.428  President Biden also sought to 
change the narrative on asylum by removing the punitive stigma 
attached to asylum applicants.429  Third, President Biden issued a 
review of other problematic pre-Trump asylum policies including 
expedited removal and safe third country agreements.430  Finally, 
President Biden is working to clarify the requirements to qualify for 
asylum and remove some of the artificial barriers that Former 
President Trump created on his way out of office.431  While there are 
still some lingering effects of Trump’s asylum policies – such as the 
continued closure of the southern border due to a health order432 – 
President Biden has already made improvements to correct the issues 
of former President Trump’s asylum policy. 
 
424 Id. 
425 See, e.g., Exec. Order. No. 14,010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,267 (Feb. 2, 2021); Exec. 
Order. No. 14,013, supra note 328; Exec. Order. No. 14012, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,277 
(Feb. 2, 2021). 
426 Exec. Order. No. 14,012, supra note 415. 
427 Exec. Order. No. 14,010, supra note 425. 
428 Exec. Order. No. 14,013, supra note 328.  While this Executive Order 
specifically addresses refugees, as stated earlier in this Note, asylees and refugees 
are regularly treated very similarly under American immigration law – especially 
since the Refugee Act of 1980.  Id.; see supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.   
429 Sarah Libowsky & Krista Oehlke, President Bident’s Immigration Executive 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
As former President Clinton once said,  
 
America has constantly drawn strength . . .  from 
wave[s] . . .  of immigrants.  In each generation, they 
have proved to be the most restless, the most 
adventurous, the most innovative, the most industrious 
of people[;] . . .  they have strengthened our economy, 
enriched our culture, renewed our promise of freedom 
and opportunity for all.433   
 
On the other hand, then Senator John F. Kennedy wrote about the 
greatness of America as “[a] [n]ation of [i]mmigrants”434 and warned 
readers of his book about the dangers of devaluing the immigrant 
population in America through protectionist rhetoric by saying, 
“[h]owever, under the guise of warning people about the impact of 
illegal immigration, these anti-immigrant groups often invoke the 
same dehumanizing racist stereotypes as hate groups.”435 
These two quotes paired together show why well-intentioned 
immigration reform needs to remain a constant throughout each and 
every administration, not just ebb and flow between presidential 
policies.  However, unless there is significant change in the interplay 
between the federal branches of government in the field of 
immigration law, much of the fate of those truly in need is in the 
hands of a single individual and the wishes of his or her 
administration.  While this systemic change would be optimal to 
provide stable and transparent policies in a highly complicated area 
of the law, there are no signs of Congress or the Court attempting to 
regain their immigration policy power from an overzealous executive 
branch any time soon.  Thus, moving forward, one can only hope that 
President Biden continues to make positive progress in the field of 
asylum law and that future presidents can keep the door open that 
former President Trump tried to deadbolt permanently shut through 
the unjust, yet still constitutional, use of the executive power. 
 
433 clintonlibrary42, Pres. Clinton’s Commencement Address at Portland State 
Univ. (1998), at 46:21, YOUTUBE (June 21, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2VOi1R0ylDs. 
434 JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1958). 
435 Id. at xiv. 
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